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Executive summary
In 2009, after years of discussion, the European Union adopted the European
Works Councils Recast Directive. The principal aims were to increase the
amount of European Works Councils (EWCs) and to improve the functioning
of the existing and future EWCs. In the Recast, an evaluation of the
implementation was envisaged for June 2016.
For the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), EWCs have always been a
priority. From the beginning, the ETUI has monitored their development and
now currently runs the most exhaustive database available on EWCs. Making
thorough use of this database, this report presents an evaluation of the
effectiveness of the Recast Directive in reaching its declared objectives. The
conclusions of this report are based on data from more than 1400 EWCs
created over the years and the analysis of more than 1000 EWC agreements. 
While the Recast Directive was a clear improvement on the original Directive,
and contributed to the legal certainty around EWCs in several ways, the overall
conclusion of this evaluation is that it was in most respects too little, too late
for enabling the establishment of more and better EWCs.
1. More EWCs: too little
Based on the results of this research, the Recast Directive was found to be
ineffective in stimulating the creation of more EWCs. Both during the second
transition period and in the post-Recast period, the amount of newly created
EWCs declined and continues to do so. There are still lots of firms that could
have an EWC but do not have one yet, so this decline in the growth rate is
unlikely to be the result of what this report refers to as a saturated population;
neither can it be attributed to the existence of alternative ways of organizing
transnational information and consultation.
The legal instruments provided by the Recast to boost the establishment of
new EWCs (transition period, information to trade unions and clarification on
who should provide the necessary information for the negotiations) have
proven ineffective and insufficient. The multiple obstacles faced by employees
in creating EWCs are left unaddressed by the current legal framework.
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The Recast was ineffective in
boosting the establishment of
new EWCs. A lack of incentives
seems to be the major
explanation. 
2. Adapting EWCs: too little
Although the Recast aimed to improve the functioning of both existing and
future EWCs, it explicitly ruled out an obligation to renegotiate agreements.
The figures show that there was a slight increase of renegotiations and
amendments in the post-Recast period. This shows that EWCs did see the use
in aligning their agreements with the new rules and obligations.
The Recast also provides for an obligation (if so requested by either the
employer or employees) to fully renegotiate the EWC agreement in the event
of ‘significant structural changes’ in the company. Such a renegotiation entails
the creation of a new Special Negotiation Body (SNB) and thus leads to a brand
new EWC. This so-called adaptation clause was expected to serve as a
converging factor, as it gives some EWCs the possibility to change their pre-
Directive status. Such a convergence did not materialize. Few EWCs have
transformed from pre-Directive into normal Article 6 EWCs. 
The ineffectiveness of the adaptation clause is likely caused by various factors
which are left unaddressed by the Recast: insufficient knowledge of the
existence of this clause, limited legal clarity on what ‘significant change of
structure’ means, other priorities for employee representatives and
management in the event of a merger, power dynamics, high perceived costs
and low perceived added value. 
One of the consequences of the limited effectiveness of the adaptation clause
is that a considerable number of EWCs continue to function as pre-Directive
EWCs (42%). Many of these have never renegotiated their agreement. This
undermines the ability of any regulation to influence the content of EWC
agreements and therefore influence EWC practice. 
3. Better EWCs: too little, too late
This report studies the contribution of the Recast to creating better EWCs. For
this, EWC agreements established before, during and after the Recast are
compared, expecting to observe significant differences in their content. The
focus was on the presence of the following agreement characteristics which are
likely to be stimulated by the Recast: information and consultation definitions,
the presence of a select committee, training clauses, definition of the
‘transnational competence’, a clause on reporting back to employees, access to
company premises, preparatory and debriefing meetings, the presence of a
trade union representative, and the inclusion of renegotiation and termination
clauses. 
The results show that a clear Recast effect is observable for only three of these
characteristics: information and consultation definitions, definition of the
transnational competence and the presence of a clause on reporting back. 
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The Recast led to a minor
increase in renegotiations and
amendments of existing EWC
agreements.
The adaptation clause of the
Recast was of limited
effectiveness. Obstacles in
using this clause remain
unaddressed by both the
Recast and the national
implementation laws. 
A large proportion of EWCs
(42%) remain exempt from
the rules of the Recast,
limiting its potential effect.
Many have never renegotiated
their agreement. This
undermines the ability of
regulation to affect the EWC
reality.
An observable Recast effect
could only be established for
the inclusion of definitions of
information, consultation and
the transnational competence,
and clauses on reporting back
in EWC agreements.
For all the other variables, a Recast effect could not be identified. In most cases,
however, EWCs seem to learn and copy practices from each other, one example
being the provision of training. This means that with every passing year, more
agreements tend to include these clauses. Throughout this report, this
phenomenon is referred to as the ‘learning effect’.
In the case of the select committee, training clauses and preparatory and
debriefing meetings, almost all agreements signed just before the Recast
already included these clauses. There was therefore only limited room for
improvement, explaining why a Recast effect could not be established. On these
topics the Recast merely affirmed the fact that in virtually all recent EWC
agreements these aspects are already included. 
For the inclusion of trade union representatives and giving EWC members
access to the company premises, no Recast effect is observed; although there
remains great potential for improvement. The vague way in which these
objectives were included in the Recast was inefficient at boosting their
inclusion in EWC agreements.
4. Policy and learning
One of the major explanations for the limited effect of the Recast Directive on
the content of EWC agreements is the observed strong learning effects, which
leave only limited room for improvement. The fact that in many ways these
learning effects surpassed the policy effects, and that policy (by means of the
Recast) only managed to catch up with learning, can be explained in two ways. 
One the one hand, learning in EWCs was particularly strong. Thanks to the
efforts of the European Trade Union Federations in providing coordination for
EWCs’ negotiation and practice, and the development of specialized training
courses, some practices proliferated very quickly. 
On the other hand, policy is particularly weak. In many cases, the Recast only
stipulates what should be regulated but does not prescribe the content or
specific solutions. There is also no administrative monitoring or sanctioning
policy organized to enforce compliance. This, together with legislation that
merely reflects the most common and accepted practices already in place,
reduces the potential for strong policy effects.
5. Conclusion: too little, too late
In conclusion, the Recast Directive can be considered as being too little, too
late to really lead to more and better EWCs. It was too little to encourage the
establishment of new EWCs, as it did not provide instruments to overcome
various obstacles in their formation. It similarly provides insufficient levers to
make the adaptation clause effective in reality. Several of the Recast
interventions to increase the effectiveness of EWCs came too late as they were
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The Recast merely affirmed
the already-existing reality of
omnipresent select committees
and training rights.
The Recast did not effectively
boost the inclusion of trade
union representatives in EWCs
or with the provision of access
to company premises. A lack of
legal instruments to enforce
this objective is the most likely
cause.
Learning effects surpassed
policy effects.
already omnipresent in recently renegotiated agreements. Furthermore, the
Recast provided insufficient incentives to promote other more uncommon
good practices. More generally, the Recast can be considered as too little
because it established some rights, and forces agreements to mention some
clauses, but provides little guidance with regards to content and compliance. 
6. The future: more and better
Future policy intervention should provide real resources and incentives for the
creation of more and better EWCs. From this evaluation study we identify six
potential areas of progress:
1. Policy which drives pro-active innovation: instead of reflecting
commonly accepted practices, policy should stimulate less commonly
employed good practices to really upgrade the functioning of the average
EWC.
2. Right and levers to use them: establishing a certain right (e.g. renego -
tiation in case of structural change) without providing the necessary
instruments to make this right effective in practice should be avoided.
Rights should be combined with effective resources to overcome common
obstacles.
3. Focus on capacity building: if policy aims to promote the establishment
of more EWCs, it should focus on building up the capacity of the partners
to make good use of the EWC, but also ensure their capacity to negotiate
an agreement. Here, investment in trade union organizations and local
information and consultation institutions is essential.
4. Knowledge and information: other major obstacles in the estab -
lishment of more EWCs and the effective use of the rights at hand include
limited knowledge of the existing rules and insufficient information on
which companies are covered by the Directive (lack of a company
registry). 
5. Monitoring of formal compliance with EWC agreements could be
developed in order to reduce the legal uncertainty arising from diversity
in legal arrangements, itself being a consequence of the policy of ‘regu -
lated self-regulation.’ 
6. Clarity in objectives: certain objectives of the Recast (e.g. stimulating
trade union involvement) were included implicitly. Naturally, the
effectiveness of these policy interventions is limited. If policy aims to
stimulate certain practices, these objectives should be clearly included in
the legal texts and backed by robust provisions.
Stan De Spiegelaere
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7. Infographic
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Introduction 
2016 is the year in which Europe can engage in an in-depth evaluation of how
the 2009 Recast of the original 1994 Directive on European Works Councils
(EWCs) has been implemented. This evaluation promises to be a subject of
contestation, triggering a discussion not only on the merits and limitations of
the current legislation, but also on the desirability of further policy steps. 
While most countries and social partners acknowledge the relevance, potential
and added value of EWCs, there is no shared opinion on what the role of policy
should be in this. Employee representatives and trade unions wish to bolster
the functioning of the EWCs by establishing clearer rights and competences
for representatives. In this approach, policy has a role to play. BusinessEurope,
on the other hand, fears the mounting costs of EWCs and their impact on
decision-making. They therefore support a more voluntary approach: if wished
for, companies should be able to develop extensive EWCs, but they should not
be forced to do so. Clearly, policy has only a restricted role in such a scenario.
Before a debate on future policy steps can take place, a thorough evaluation of
the successes and failures of past policy is necessary. This report is the
contribution of the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) towards this
evaluation exercise.
From the perspective of the ETUI, supporting the development of the EWCs
has always been a priority. These councils form a unique platform for employee
representatives from all over Europe to meet, exchange information and
discuss matters that affect them all. It is the only forum in which they can be
informed and consulted about the overarching strategy of the firm and how it
affects the employees. An EWC also gives the employers the opportunity to
consult employee representatives on planned policies and incorporate their
views. Moreover, together with the later established SE (societas europaea)
Works Councils, EWCs are the only policy-backed institutions that might lead
to a much needed Europeanisation of industrial relations. 
Because of this, the ETUI has long invested in researching and monitoring the
development of EWCs. The EWC database ran by the ETUI (ewcdb.eu) is
currently the most exhaustive database on available EWC agreements and also
collects information on EWC evolutions, as well as relevant company
information. The purpose of this database is to monitor developments in
EWCs, provide access to information for practitioners and researchers, and
enable a more in-depth analysis of evolutions over time. 
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1. European Works Councils
Creating a single European market was one of the policy priorities of the EU
in the last decade. In line with the deepening of this single market,
multinationals and national companies tend to spread their activities over
multiple Member States and thus ‘Europeanise’ their operations (Fligstein and
Merand 2002). As these firms Europeanise, their management also moves to
the transnational level. Crucial strategic decisions are no longer taken by
national management, but in European or global headquarters. 
At the same time, almost all European countries have developed systems of
employee information and consultation. Mostly, these systems require the
organization of local and national works councils. In these works councils,
employee representatives are informed about the company situation, strategy
and any upcoming changes, enabling them to voice their concerns about these
decisions.
When company decisions are taken at a transnational level, the national
systems of employee information and consultation no longer suffice.
Employees in multinationals are unable to get the crucial transnational
information and can no longer defend their interests to the real, transnational,
decision-makers. In order to cope with this problem of levels, the European
Union decided to install several regulatory frameworks on the transnational
information and consultation of employees. As such, directives were developed
regarding employee involvement in the case of collective redundancies,
transfer of undertakings, cross-border mergers, and employee involvement in
European companies, among others (ETUC and ETUI 2016). 
One of the most important of these directives was the 1994 Directive on the
European Works Councils (EWCs). This Directive covers a wide range of
companies and led to the establishment of hundreds of EWCs, of which there
were more than 1000 up and running in 2015 (De Spiegelaere and Jagodzinski
2015). 
European works councils are bodies for employee information and
consultation on transnational issues. They bring together representatives of
the employees and employers to discuss the transnational company strategy
and policy, and their potential consequences for employees. 
2. The EWC Directives
The EWC Directives (both the 1994 original and 2009 Recast) regulate the
establishment of European Works Councils in European multinationals that
have at least 1000 employees in the countries covered by the Directive, of which
at least 150 are employed in two different countries. In such companies, and
after an initiative from the employee or employer side, an EWC is to be
negotiated and installed. 
Stan De Spiegelaere
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2.1 Regulated self-regulation and EWC agreements
The Directives provide general requirements on the procedures, competences,
role and composition of an EWC; but in general the choice is left to the
company employer and employee representatives to agree on the specifics.
Almost all EWCs are therefore based on a negotiated agreement. If the parties
are not able to reach such an agreement, pre-designed rules apply (the so-
called ‘subsidiary requirements’). The EWC regulation is hence an example of
regulated self-regulation, as it gives the opportunity of self-regulation within
certain limits and including some auxiliary rules (Platzer 2002). 
An EWC is thus never created ‘by default’. Employers and employees need to
go through a (lengthy) process of negotiations before they can establish an
EWC by agreement, or according to the subsidiary requirements when no
agreement can be reached.1
In the large majority of cases, an agreement is established and signed between
the different parties. This EWC agreement forms the cornerstone of the EWC
functioning, as it specifies the mutual rights, obligations, and procedures to be
followed. The negotiation of an EWC agreement is done by an existing EWC
or by a Special Negotiation Body (SNB). An SNB is a temporary body of
employee representatives that enters into negotiations with the management
on how to structure the functioning of the EWC. 
The EWC agreement is also one of the primary interfaces in which the policy
maker tries to affect the functioning of the EWC in practice. Both EWC
Directives specified the need for the negotiating parties to discuss and mention
a topic, rather than indicating a preferred outcome. In Article 6 of the original
EWC Directive, clear indications are given on what the EWC agreement must
discuss and mention. Examples include the composition of the EWC, its
functions and procedures, the frequency of meetings, the financial means, and
the duration of the agreement. In the Recast, this article was extended with
more specifications. By extending this to-do list of EWC agreements, the policy
makers aimed to (indirectly) influence the practical functioning of the EWCs
in the field.
Beyond Article 6, however, both the EWC Directive and the Recast rely on the
individual agreements to specify the details of how the EWC functions. The
EWC Recast Directive clearly establishes several rights: in Article 10§4, the
right to training; in Article 10§1, the obligation of management to provide the
means required to apply these rights; and in Article 10§2, the necessity to
report back to the employees. An effective implementation of these
specifications requires agreement on how they should be enacted but (strictly
speaking) they do not have to be outlined in the specific agreement. 
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1. The negotiating partners can also decide not to establish an EWC but instead initiate a
‘procedure for information and consultation of employees’. Such a procedure should
guarantee the provision of equally qualitative information and consultation to employees.
In practice, this option is used only rarely. 
To conclude, observations reveal that on various topics the policy makers
aimed to influence the effectiveness of EWCs by extending (directly and
indirectly) the scope of the EWC agreements. In other words, the Directives
push the negotiation partners to talk and agree on many more topics and hope
that this will boost the functioning of the EWC. Consequently, this report will
focus on an evaluation of how this policy intervention (the Recast Directive)
affected the content of EWC agreements. 
2.2 Transition periods
In order to get the EWCs up and running, the 1994 EWC Directive included
the infamous Article 13, which stressed the ‘self-regulatory’ aspect. This article
stipulates that EWCs created before the EWC Directive came into force (on 22
September 1996) were exempted from the rules of the Directive and were
therefore fully ‘self-regulated’ or voluntary. This article created a transition
period which led to a record number of companies negotiating and agreeing
swiftly on the establishment of EWCs. Since then, two kinds of EWCs exist: the
pre-Directive Article 13 EWCs, which are exempt from the obligations arising
from the Directive, and the post-Directive Article 6 EWCs, which are fully
covered by the Directive and all its obligations. 
With the Recast Directive, the European institutions wished to again
incorporate a transition period in order to boost the negotiations and
establishment of EWCs, and so included Article 14.1b. This article stipulates
that agreements or renegotiations made between 5 June 2009 and 5 June 2011
are exempted from the new obligations arising from the Recast (e.g. training
rights), but are not exempted from the rules and obligations of the first
Directive.
From 2009 onwards then, we can distinguish between three types of EWC
agreements, according to their regulatory status:
1. Pre-Directive EWCs: The first are the agreements made in EWCs
established under Article 13 of the original Directive. This article specifies
that the Directive shall not apply to EWC agreements made before 22nd
September 1996. Moreover, if such agreements are later renewed or
renegotiated they continue to be exempted from the rules of the Directive.
These agreements are sometimes called ‘voluntary agreements’, ‘Article
13 agreements’ or ‘pre-Directive agreements’. 
2. Article 6 EWCs: A second type are the agreements from EWCs
established under Article 6 of either the original EWC or Recast Directive.
These agreements are fully covered by the Directive and all its rights and
obligations. 
3. Article 14.1b EWCs: The third type are the Article 14.1b agreements,
established under the regulation of Article 14.1b of the Recast Directive.
This article stipulates that agreements (both original and renegotiations)
Stan De Spiegelaere
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made between 5 June 2009 and 5 June 2011 be given a special status. The
definitions and principles of the Recast apply to those agreements, but
not the ‘new obligations’ (Picard 2010).
In March 2016, of all the EWCs in force, 42% (395) were still exempted from
the rules of the Directive and the Recast (so-called pre-Directive EWCs), 53%
(495) were functioning as Article 6 EWCs, and 3% (31) were functioning as
Article 14.1b EWCs. Additionally, nine information and consultation
procedures were registered, alongside twelve EWCs functioning under the
subsidiary requirements. 
2.3 The Recasting process
In the original EWC Directive an official ‘review’ of the Directive was envisaged
after a period of five years. In 1999 it became clear that a possible revision of
the Directive would not be a quick and simple process. While the European
Parliament supported a revision, the visions of the social partners were not
aligned. 
The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) pushed the EU to move
towards a revision. On its wish list were several changes that were to drastically
improve the effectiveness of EWCs. More specifically, the ETUC sought to
improve the definitions of information, consultation and transnational;
improve rights for training, time off and meetings for EWC representatives;
reduce the period over which special negotiating bodies (SNBs) could
deliberate over the establishment of an EWC; reduce the workforce size
thresholds, thereby increasing the coverage of the Directive; and introduce a
clear and defined role for trade unions (Jagodzinski 2009). 
BusinessEurope was openly opposed to a revision, on the grounds that the five-
year period would be too short to make real conclusions about the
(mal)functioning of the EWCs; furthermore, any additional burden on
companies was to be avoided. BusinessEurope favoured a more voluntary
approach to European industrial relations. Furthermore, BusinessEurope
argued that a decrease of the threshold was undesirable and that the three-
year negotiation period was necessary. 
The position of managers responsible for EWCs within multinational
companies (MNCs) was different. They acknowledged deficiencies but also saw
the added value of including an EWC in company decision-making processes,
for the working of communication systems and for generating employee
commitment (Lamers 1998). 
Although the social partners declined to work towards a negotiated solution,
they did publish a ‘Joint Advice’ in August 2008 describing their shared
opinion (Jagodzinski 2010). 
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In light of the differences in approach to the revision of the Directive, it is no
surprise that both the ETUC and BusinessEurope saw the Recast as not entirely
satisfactory. Through extensive lobbying, BusinessEurope was successful in
excluding from the Recast the clauses on a reduction in the SNB negotiation
period and on changes to the workforce-size thresholds, but was unable to
prevent the revision per se. The ETUC secured amendments intended to
improve the operation of EWCs. 
3. The evaluation of the Recast Directive 
Just as in the first EWC Directive, the Recast Directive includes an article
envisaging a report on the implementation of the Recast by June 2016, together
with the specification of appropriate proposals for change. This report
contributes to this exercise by evaluating the effectiveness of the Recast in
attaining its declared objectives. These objectives are reflected in Recital 7:
‘It is necessary to modernise Community legislation on transnational
information and consultation of employees with a view to ensuring the
effectiveness of employees’ transnational information and consultation
rights, increasing the proportion of European Works Councils established
while enabling the continuous functioning of existing agreements,
resolving the problems encountered in the practical application of
Directive 94/45/EC and remedying the lack of legal certainty resulting
from some of its provisions or the absence of certain provisions, and
ensuring that Community legislative instruments on information and
consultation of employees are better linked.’
The Recast thus has a triple objective: (1) to promote the establishment of more
EWCs, (2) to improve the functioning of existing EWCs, and (3) to provide
legal certainty to EWCs (Kerckhofs 2010; European Commission 2016). In this
report we assess and evaluate the efficacy of the Recast in bringing about more
and better EWCs. 
In doing so, this report draws largely on the data collected in the European
Works Council Database. Using this database, this report presents an
evaluation of the Recast Directive structured as follows:
— The first chapter discusses whether the Recast was successful in
promoting the establishment of more EWCs. 
— The second chapter studies whether the type of EWC agreements
changed in the post-Recast period and whether or not the adaptation
clause was effective.
— The third chapter considers whether the Recast was effective in
contributing to better EWCs.
Stan De Spiegelaere
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— Following these three chapters, a general conclusion offers several
specific policy recommendations.
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Chapter 1: More EWCs?
Abstract
The EWC Recast Directive aimed to stimulate the establishment of new EWCs in order to
enlarge the coverage of the Directive. For this, some changes were introduced regarding
the roles of the Special Negotiation Body and of the social partners; a transition period
(a so-called ‘window of opportunity’) was also included. However, data shows that there
was no increase in the amount of newly established EWCs; not during the transition period,
nor in the post-Recast period. An estimation of the coverage rates suggests that saturation
of the population cannot explain the lack of renewed momentum, nor can the availability
of alternatives in organising transnational information and consultation. The conclusion
is that the Recast was ineffective in stimulating the establishment of more EWCs because
it does not address common obstacles to EWC establishment. 
In line with the idea of ‘regulated self-regulation’, the establishment of a
European Works Council is mandatory only after an initiative is taken by the
employer or employee’s side. If no initiative is taken, there is no obligation to
set up an EWC, even if the company employs the requisite amount of
employees in several European countries. The amount of EWCs thus depends
on the number of employees or employers who know about the possibility and
who see the value in organizing an EWC. 
The European legislator tried to stimulate companies and employees to work
towards the establishment of EWCs in several ways. The most well-known of
these initiatives is the transition period (the so-called ‘window of opportunity’)
included in the first EWC Directive. According to this, EWCs established before
22 September 1996 are exempted from the rules of the Directive as long as they
fulfil some conditions. This rule led to a surge in the number of EWCs, with
more than 400 EWCs created in 1996. 
After this transition period ended, the pace of establishing EWCs dropped
steeply and continued to decline over the years (Jagodzinski 2011). However,
this is not a case of there being a saturated population of companies with
EWCs; reports show that there continue to be a lot of multinational companies
without a functioning EWC and thus lacking genuine information and
consultation rights on transnational issues (Kerckhofs 2010).
Confronted with these developments, it was one of the main (declared)
objectives of the 2009 Recast of the EWC Directive to give a new impetus to
the creation of EWCs. For this, the Recast provided several instruments that
were to lead to a new wave of establishment of EWCs, including a second
transition period similar to the one included in the first Directive. 
How an EWC is established is regulated by the EWC Directive and its Recast.
In short,  either employees or the employer can request that an EWC be
established. Once this initiative is taken, a temporary Special Negotiation Body
(SNB) is convened, comprising employee representatives from each Member
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State in which the company has employees. This SNB has up to three years to
negotiate an EWC agreement with management which regulates the
competences and functioning of the EWC. Once an agreement is reached, the
EWC is established. If no agreement is reached before the end of the three-
year period, or if negotiations are not taken up as requested, fall-back rules
apply. In this case, an EWC is created according to the subsidiary requirements
laid out in the EWC Directive, in which the basic rules governing the EWC are
defined. Therefore, in theory, every formal request to negotiate an EWC should
lead to the establishment of an EWC; either by agreement or according to the
subsidiary requirements. 
This chapter will discuss whether or not the Recast was effective in stimulating
the creation of new EWCs or not. It will first review the way in which the Recast
aimed to create a new dynamic. The second part discusses the evolution of the
establishment of EWCs and concludes that the Recast did not deliver on this
objective. The next parts consequently search for possible explanations for this,
such as the existence of alternatives to EWCs and compliance rates.
1. The Recast’s declared objectives and instruments
The objectives of the EWC Recast Directive are clearly established in Recital 7.
This recital includes a clear mention of the need to work towards the
establishment of more EWCs:
‘It is necessary to modernise Community legislation on transnational
information and consultation of employees with a view to (…) increasing
the proportion of European Works Councils established while enabling
the continuous functioning of existing agreements (…).’
In order to boost the amount of EWCs, the Recast Directive worked along three
lines of action.
First of all, it included a transition period similar to the one in the original EWC
Directive (14.1b). EWCs which renegotiated their agreement or were estab -
lished in the period between 5 June 2009 and 5 June 2011 are subject to a
special exemption. While still covered by the original Directive, they would not
fall under the Recast Directive; the new rules and obligations stemming from
the Recast would not apply to them. 
Second, the Recast Directive included an article (4§4) on the provision of
information required to establish a Special Negotiation Body. Faced with
unclear rules in the original Directive, some companies refused to give infor -
mation on the amount of employees working for the company in the different
European countries. Such refusals were serious obstacles to the creation of an
EWC, most famously illustrated in the Kühne-Nagel case (Dribbusch 2004;
Dorssemont and Blanke 2010). The Recast tried to solve this problem by clearly
indicating the responsibilities of the different management levels.
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Finally, the Recast strengthened the role of the European workers’ and
employers’ organizations by the inclusion of Article 5.2 and Recital 27. These
clauses required information to be sent to the European workers’ and
employer’s organizations about the start of the negotiations and the
composition of the SNB. This rule aimed to further the involvement of, for
example, the European Trade Union Federations, and consequently to increase
the number (as well as the quality) of EWC agreements. 
These three lines of action were to contribute to a new dynamic in the creation
of EWCs, both during the transition period and afterwards. 
2. EWC growth rate
Using the data of the European Works Council Database (www.ewcdb.eu), the
question of whether the Recast was successful in boosting the establishment
of new EWCs can be addressed. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the number of
EWCs over time. The two shaded areas refer to the number of EWCs created
and dissolved, and the full line reflects the total number of active EWCs
between 1989 and 2015. The slope of this full line thus represents the net
growth rate: the number of established EWCs minus the dissolved. EWCs
dissolve for various reasons, but primarily because of mergers and acquisitions
of firms (De Spiegelaere and Jagodzinski 2015).
The evolution shows some interesting patterns. There is a slow growth of EWCs
before the introduction of regulation. In the run up to the application of the
first Directive (the first transition period), a record amount of EWCs were
created, resulting in a net growth of about 400 EWCs in 1996. Immediately
afterwards, the net growth rate declined to around 50 a year and, over time, it
dropped even further to less than 20 in the years running up to the Recast. 
Stan De Spiegelaere
22 Report 138
Figure 1 Establishment and dissolution of EWCs
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
EWCs dissolved
EWCs created
Total EWCs
The main, if not the only, observable event in this evolution is the first
transition period. The accession of the UK to the system in 1997 and the
extension towards most Central and East European countries in 2004, and
towards Bulgaria and Romania in 2006, did not significantly impact the
establishment of new EWCs.
At first sight, the Recast does not seem to have impacted the net growth rate
of EWCs. There is no visible change during the transition period, nor after the
full implementation of the Recast in 2011. The net growth trend declines and
continues to do so, independent of the Recast Directive. 
A comparison between the period preceding the Recast, the transition period
and the post-Recast period gives a more detailed insight into the trend over
the last decade. Table 1 details the numbers of established and dissolved EWCs
in these three periods, including also the net growth rate. 
This table clearly shows that the second transition period (between 5 June
2009 and 5 June 2011) did not lead to a momentum equal to that of the first
transition period. Between 2009 and 2011 only 66 new EWCs were created. In
the three preceding years more than 100 were created and in the three
following years, 52. 
This pattern is most likely related to the mixed experiences of EWCs and trade
unions in the first transition period. This period led to a massive increase in
the amount of EWCs, but a large proportion of those EWCs still function in a
regulatory vacuum. Although their agreements tend to reflect the rules,
obligations and definitions of the Directive, the legacy of this first transition
period is still present (ETUC and ETUI 2016). This led the trade unions to resist
the establishment of Article 14.1b EWCs in this transition period and to actively
advise not to establish or renegotiate EWC agreements in this time frame (e.g.
Picard 2010). 
This resistance is also visible in the fact that only 31 of the EWCs which were
established or which renegotiated their agreement in that period can be
rightfully identified as functioning under Article 14.1b of the Recast. All others
have explicitly chosen in their agreements to establish themselves as Article 6
EWCs, or they were pre-Directive EWCs that wished to keep that status.
Obviously, the second transition period did not succeed in boosting the
establishment of new EWCs. 
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Table 1 EWC growth rate before, during and after the Recast
Period
2006-2008
2009-2011
2012-2014
Established
104
66
52
Dissolved
-45
-24
-28
Net growth rate
59
42
24
The Recast aimed to stimulate the establishment of EWCs in, but also after,
the transition period. In other words, it aimed to have a continuing effect on
the growth of EWCs. Table 1 also clearly shows that in the post-Recast period,
the growth rate did not recover to pre-Recast levels. Taking into account the
amount of dissolved EWCs, we even observe a continuously decreasing net
growth rate. 
These results show that the Recast Directive was not effective in attaining its
goal of ‘increasing the proportion of European Works Councils established’;
not during the second transition period, nor in the post-Recast period. Whether
the Recast was instrumental in slowing down the growth rate of EWCs is,
however, not certain either. Prior to the Recast Directive, a continuous decline
in the growth rate was identified, which continued independent of the Recast. 
Box 1 The transition period
Article 14.1b of the EWC Recast Directive states:
‘Without prejudice to Article 13, the obligations arising from this Directive shall
not apply to Community-scale undertakings or Community-scale groups of
undertakings in which (…)
(b) an agreement concluded pursuant to Article 6 of Directive 94/45/EC is
signed or revised between 5 June 2009 and 5 June 2011.’ 
This article introduced a transition period between the Directive and the Recast. EWCs
created or renegotiated in that transition period are exempted from the rules of the
Recast, but remain fully covered by the rules of the original Directive (as transposed in
national law). The objective of this transition period was to give an impetus to the
creation of new EWCs, similar to that of the first transition period included in the original
Directive. This first transition period saw the establishment of about 400 EWCs.
The second transition period, however, was markedly less successful. In this period, 83
agreements were signed, 28 of which were first agreements establishing an EWC, 9
were renegotiations and 46 were amendments or extensions. It should be noted that
the trade unions actively advised against establishing an EWC or renegotiating an
agreement in this period since this would result in EWCs being partly exempted from
the new provisions of the Recast (Picard 2010). 
In the end, only 31 EWCs can be rightly considered as Art. 14.1b EWCs, as the others ex -
plic itly ruled out that possibility in the agreements. Of those 31, 22 were EWCs which were
established for the first time in that period and 9 were already existing EWCs which trans -
formed their legal status from a pre-Directive or Article 6 EWC into an Article 14.1b EWC.
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Obviously, the transition period provided by the Recast did not duplicate the experience
of the first transition period. Only a few EWCs were created or renegotiated in that
period and some of them explicitly ruled out the possibility of falling under the rules of
Art. 14.1b. What the transition period did produce, however, was an additional diversity
in the legal frameworks of EWCs, adding to the general complexity of the issue. 
3. Compliance: are there still suﬃcient companies?
One possible explanation for the small number of newly established EWCs in
the last decade is a possible saturation of the population: of all the companies
eligible to have an EWC, most might already have one. The fewer companies
that can potentially establish an EWC, the slower the growth is likely to be. 
In order to assess this hypothesis, a compliance rate needs to be calculated.
Such a compliance rate reflects the share of companies - of all those companies
covered by the Directive - which have an EWC. The amount of companies with
an EWC is known but the amount of companies covered by the Directive is not,
as there is no administrative obligation for multinationals to report the number
of their employees in different Member States. There is consequently no
reference population. 
Up until 2009, the ETUI tried to assess the population of multinational
corporations (MNCs) covered by the Directive by establishing a database on
them (Kerckhofs 2010). While imperfect, this database was for a long time the
only reference to calculate compliance rates. Due to the continuous
restructuring of companies, this database has not been updated since 2009.
The last available estimation of the overall compliance rate is therefore for
2009 (Kerckhofs 2010; Waddington 2010).
The information on the amount of companies covered by the EWC Directive
over the years can, however, be instrumental in estimating the amount of
companies covered by the Directive in the years after 2009. An extrapolation
of the yearly growth rate in companies covered by the Directive, observed since
2004 (the moment the Central-East European countries were included in the
scope of the Directive), provides us with an estimated amount of companies
covered between 2010 and 2015. By combining this information with the
known amount of established EWCs, an estimated compliance rate can be
calculated for the 2010-2015 period (Figure 2).
This estimation illustrated in Figure 2 shows that the (relatively) slow net
growth rate of EWCs was only instrumental in stabilizing the observed
compliance rate of 2009. The estimated compliance rate of 2014 is less than
40%. While this estimation is not perfect, the results show at least that an
almost full compliance rate (saturation) cannot be the reason for the slowing
growth rate of EWCs.
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4. Alternatives: are EWCs transforming into
alternative legal frameworks?
A second possible explanation for the few newly established EWCs in the last
decade is the emergence of alternative solutions for transnational information
and consultation. Since 2004, European multinationals can organize under the
European Company (Societas Europaea, SE) legal structure. Companies
adopting such a structure can, after negotiations, organize transnational
information and consultation of employees through the establishment of an
SE Works Council (SEWC). The rules on the establishment and function of an
SEWC are very similar to those of the EWCs (Jagodzinski 2013).
Possibly, companies could increasingly establish SEWCs instead of EWCs to
organise information and consultation on transnational issues. This would be
reflected in a slowing down of the growth rate of EWCs, yet in an overall
increase of bodies with principally the same function. Even though an SEWC
can be used as an alternative to an EWC (if the company also changes its legal
structure), SEWCs constitute more than an alternative. Companies not covered
by the EWC Directive can become SEs and install an SEWC. The scope of the
SEWCs is therefore potentially larger than that of the EWCs. 
The European Works Council Database also collects information on established
SEWCs. The information on both institutions is presented in Figure 3. This
figure is identical to Figure 1 up until 2005. In 2005 the first SEWC was
established, hence the divergence of the lines. 
Even though the increase of SEWCs indeed leads to a higher growth rate in the
years after the implementation of the SE Directive, it is not of such a size as to
increase the overall net growth pace in the years after the Recast.
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Figure 2 (Estimated) compliance rates
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Table 2 details the numbers of established and dissolved EWCs and SEWCs,
as well as the net common growth rate. As mentioned before, adding the
SEWCs to the figures increases the overall growth rate but, in comparison with
the pre-Recast period and the interim period, the net growth rate in the post-
Recast period is still lower. Adding the SEWCs to the amount of EWCs does
not change the conclusion of a general slowing down of the growth rate of
EWCs (or of the alternative frameworks). Moreover, the SEWCs are potentially
established in firms that are not covered by the EWC Directive. 
Another way of looking at the SEWC as a potential alternative to the EWC is
by studying the number of EWCs that dissolved and transformed into SEWCs
because of a change of legal structure in the company. Over the years, only 15
EWCs have gone through such a transition. Of those 15, 11 were pre-Directive
EWCs and 4 were Article 6 EWCs. 
Both results suggest that the existence of an alternative way of organizing
information and consultation on transnational issues cannot explain the small
number of EWCs created in the last decade. Only a few have transformed, and
even if combined, the overall growth rate is still lower in the transition and
post-Recast periods when compared to the pre-Recast period. 
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Figure 3 Establishment of EWCs and SEWCs 
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Table 2 EWC and SEWC growth before, during and after the Recast
Period
2006-2008
2009-2011
2012-2014
Established
135
95
87
Dissolved
-52
-27
-28
Net growth rate
83
68
59
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5. Changing company characteristics
Focusing on the characteristics of the companies in which the new EWCs are
established, some minor but significant trends are apparent. In the tables
below, the characteristics of the newly established EWCs are given for
successive five-year periods. From the first table we conclude that a higher
share of the newly established EWCs is established in small multinationals
(< 5000 employees). In the last period (2010-2014) the (net) share has risen
to about 50% of all EWCs created in that year.
Table 4 shows the distribution over the country clusters. This table shows that
the share of EWCs established in mixed market economies (MMEs) is rising
over time and accounts for more than one fourth of all newly established EWCs
in the last five years. With regards to the other clusters, an overall trend is
difficult to establish next to some minor fluctuations.
Table 5 shows the sectoral distribution of the newly established EWCs. This
table shows a minor decrease in the share of the chemical and metal sectors
(in terms of newly established EWCs) in favour of the ‘other/unknown’ sector.
In this cluster, textile, transport and public service sectors are grouped.
Table 3 Company size of new EWCs
Period
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2009
2010-2014
Unknown
4%
6%
26%
39%
Small 
(< 5.000)
40% (41%)
37% (40%)
31% (41%)
31% (50%)
Medium 
(5.000-10.000)
16% (17%)
21% (22%)
18% (24%)
10% (16%)
Large
(> 10.000)
40% (42%)
36% (39%)
26% (34%)
21% (34%)
Total (N) 
642
224
133
67
Note: Percentages in parentheses are the net percentages, not including the ‘unknown’ category. The proportional increase of the amount of
companies with unknown data on their size is caused by a rupture in the systematic tracking of the company sizes.
Table 4 Company HQ cluster of new EWCs
Period
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2009
2010-2015
Nordic
17%
15%
15%
16%
CME
39%
33%
31%
35%
MME
10%
23%
19%
27%
LME
35%
29%
35%
21%
Total (N)
642
224
133
67
Note: Country clusters: Nordic (DE, NO, SE, FI, IS), Coordinated Market Economies (DE, BE,NL, AU, LU, CH), Mixed Market Economies (FR, IT, PO, ES,
EL), Liberal Market Economies (UK, IE, US, CA, JP and all other countries). 
In conclusion, new EWCs are still predominantly created in companies where
they are already traditionally prone to be established (large multinationals,
companies headquartered in coordinated market economies (CMEs) and
companies from the metal or chemical industry or the service sector). However,
over time, relatively more EWCs are created in smaller companies, in
companies from MMEs and in companies from such sectors as textile,
transport and public services. 
6. Other possible explanations
If the compliance rate and the existence of alternative models cannot explain
the slowing growth rate, and if we see only a limited change in the type of
companies establishing EWCs, what are the possible alternative explanations? 
Based on the available literature and insights from practice, Figure 4 gives a
graphical illustration of the various factors at play in the establishment of a
European Works Council. 
First of all, there are three major actors at play in the potential establishment
of an EWC: (1) employees, (2) management and (3) trade unions. For the
purpose of simplicity, these actors are considered as relatively unified groups.
Based on Whittall et al.’s (2015) propositions, these actors all make a ‘trade-
off’ in considering whether or not to invest in the establishment of an EWC.
This trade-off is based on the following considerations: 
1. The perceived added value: Does the actor see a value in setting up an
EWC? Can the EWC be an effective way to defend their interests?
2. The resources needed: How much effort and cost will the
establishment and functioning of an EWC demand?
3. The resources at hand: How many resources (time, money, network
etc.) does the actor have at its disposal?
4. Other priorities: Are there other more urgent priorities which place
demand on the available resources?
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Table 5 Sector of activity of new EWCs
Period
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2009
2010-2015
Chemicals
22%
15%
12%
18%
Metal
32%
40%
34%
31%
Services
15%
19%
29%
21%
Food and
horeca
12%
8%
7%
6%
Building
7%
8%
6%
8%
Other /
unknown
12%
9%
13%
16%
This trade-off is influenced by various contextual factors. First of all, the trade-
off can only be made if the actors have knowledge of the possibility to
organize an EWC and have sufficient information about their company. This
problem of knowledge and transparency is not to be underestimated; almost
20% of the respondents of German works councils in companies covered by
the Directive did not know of the existence of EWCs, and another fifth thought
(incorrectly) that their company was not covered by the Directive (Whittall et
al. 2015).
Secondly, the variables in the trade-off are influenced by several structural
factors. These relate to the characteristics of the country, sector and company
involved. Starting with the country, different traditions in employee
involvement at the company level affect the variables in the trade-off (Hertwig
2015). Employees, managers and trade unions from countries with strong
information and consultation rights are more likely to take an interest in
organizing an EWC and to have resources (work organisation, time off etc.) to
invest in it. The sector also plays a role as it determines the degree to which
companies have a limited amount of large establishments (e.g. automobile
companies) or a large amount of small establishments internationally (e.g.
construction companies) (Marginson et al. 2013). In the second case, the cost
will be higher, as the internal networking will require more effort. In parallel,
depending on the sector of activity, a different European Trade Union
Federation will follow up on the activities of the EWC. Similarly, company
characteristics play a role. In larger companies, the available resources and
added value of an EWC are more likely to be higher than in relatively small
multinational companies. Interrelated with the company, country and sector
characteristics is, of course, the factor of trade union strength. Where trade
unions are well-developed, well-resourced institutions with a broad member
base, it is more likely that they will provide the necessary financial and non-
financial resources for the development of an EWC. 
Thirdly, the regulatory framework plays a role. Obviously, depending on
the scope of the regulation (both geographically as well as content-wise), the
actors will have a different perception of the costs, added value and resources
needed for the establishment of an EWC. Clarity on who is responsible for what
is another essential point. Legal vagueness can lead to actors not doing
anything and perceiving the costs (for example, regarding uncertain legal
action) as being very high. This brings us to the issue of sanctions. If there are
no sanctions and regulatory enforcement, not following the rules of the
Directive becomes very easy (and cheap). This, again, reduces the perceived
added value in the minds of some actors and greatly increases the resources
needed to establish an EWC.
Linking this framework to the instruments provided by the Recast to boost the
amount of EWCs exposes a large discrepancy. 
— The legal clarity on who is to provide the necessary information for the
establishment of an EWC might have prevented legal cases, but it did not
encourage management to inform employees about whether or not their
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company was covered by the Directive. It did not, in essence, solve the
problem of insufficient knowledge of the Directive.
— The possibility for an SNB to get training and external assistance might
have upgraded the quality of the SNB’s work, but it did not essentially
change the estimation made by the employees of the resources needed to
establish an EWC. Improving the functioning of an SNB does not
necessarily lead to the establishment of more SNBs, and therefore
EWCs.
— The requirement to inform the trade unions about the establishment of
an SNB did not lead to the establishment of more SNBs or EWCs either.
It might have increased the trade union involvement once an SNB was
formed, but it did not give trade unions additional instruments to
support the establishment of SNBs in companies without an EWC.
Fundamentally, the Recast Directive was not effective in stimulating the
establishment of more EWCs as the instruments it provided did nothing to:
make the case for EWCs, increase the awareness of the possibility of the
establishment of an EWC, disseminate knowledge about which companies are
eligible to establish an EWC, limit the resources needed for employee
representatives to establish an EWC, increase the capacity of employee
representatives and trade unions to establish EWCs, provide more clarity on
mutual rights and obligations, provide sufficient sanctions and enforcement
for non-compliance, or address some other structural obstacles to the
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Figure 4 Barriers to the establishment of EWCs 
The actors’ trade o:
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establishment of EWCs in non-unionized settings with scattered employment
in small multinationals. 
7. Conclusion
One of the main objectives of the EWC Recast Directive was ‘(…) increasing
the proportion of European Works Councils established.’ While new EWCs are
still being created every year, the net growth rate has significantly slowed down
over the years, both during and after the Recast: 
— during the Recast, as the transition period did not lead to a wave of new
EWCs. In this period, the amount of newly established EWCs dropped.
Moreover, several EWCs established in this period explicitly chose not to
function under the provided exemption clause;
— after the Recast, as the establishment of new EWCs in the post-Recast
period did not recover to pre-Recast levels. The EWC Recast could not
reverse the long term trend of a declining net growth rate. 
Neither of the following two explanations is able to account for this declining
growth rate. First, the estimations of the compliance rate suggest that less than
half of all eligible companies have an EWC. The declining growth rate cannot
therefore be explained by a lack of companies that are eligible and still lacking
an EWC.
Second, the existence of alternative ways of organizing transnational
information and consultation, such as the SEWCs, cannot explain the declining
net growth rate either. Even the combined growth of EWCs and SEWCs is
declining and only a few EWCs have directly transformed into SEWCs.
These observations suggest that the legal changes made in the Recast were
ineffective or insufficient to result in a new dynamic in the establishment of
EWCs. Building on existing insights into the obstacles to the establishment of
EWCs, and comparing these with the legal interventions of the Recast, leads
to the conclusion that there is an ill fit. The Recast was ineffective in
structurally stimulating the establishment of EWCs, as the instruments it
included did not do enough to address the multiple obstacles and trade-offs
involved in the establishment of an EWC. 
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Chapter 2: Adapting EWCs
Abstract
One of the main objectives of the EWC Recast Directive was to improve the functioning
of the existing EWCs. How an EWC functions is, however, negotiated and codified in EWC
agreements. In order not to force all existing EWCs to start renegotiations, the EWC Recast
explicitly mentioned that the new rights and obligations were directly applicable and
therefore there was no obligation to renegotiate. At the same time, the Recast included a
new stipulation enabling a full renegotiation of the agreement in the event of a significant
structural change in the company (the adaptation clause). This clause was intended to
give pre-Directive EWCs the option to be re-established as Article 6 EWCs, and it was
expected to lead to a certain convergence. The evaluation presented in this chapter
concludes that the Recast did increase the share of renegotiations in the post-Recast
period and that the adaptation clause did not lead to the expected convergence. 
According to Recital 7 of the Recast Directive, one of the objectives of the
Recast is to improve the functioning of the currently existing EWCs:
‘It is necessary to modernise Community legislation on transnational
information and consultation of employees with a view to ensuring the
effectiveness of employees’ transnational information and consultation
rights, increasing the proportion of European Works Councils established
while enabling the continuous functioning of existing agreements (…).’
More particularly, the Recast establishes additional requirements for
obligatory mentions in the EWC agreements, specifies definitions of some
central concepts and establishes some rights and obligations for employee
representatives. How these rights and obligations are to be applied is subject
to negotiation between the employers and employee representatives and
should be determined in the EWC agreement. 
Negotiating an EWC agreement can, however, be a lengthy and complicated
endeavour. The Recast therefore explicitly stresses that there is no formal
obligation to start renegotiations. This is clearly mentioned in Recital 41: ‘(…)
the agreements in force should be allowed to continue in order to avoid their
obligatory renegotiation (…).’ For the Article 6 EWCs, this does not mean that
they are exempted from the rules and obligations stemming from the Recast.
Although they are not forced to renegotiate, the Recast fully governs their
operations, and the adapted rights, obligations and definitions directly apply
to all Article 6 EWCs.
Although EWCs are not obliged to renegotiate, one could expect that some
EWCs will be encouraged to amend or adapt their agreement to be in line with
the Recast Directive. Even if they do not amend their agreement, the Article 6
EWCs are covered by the new rights and obligations that stem from the Recast.
In order to operationalize these right and obligations, the practicalities should
be organized in an EWC agreement. 
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For pre-Directive or Article 14.1b EWCs, this is not the case (European
Commission 2010: 55; Picard 2010). Pre-Directive EWCs and Article 14.1b
EWCs are not obliged to renegotiate their agreements and the rights and
(under certain conditions) obligations stemming from the Recast do not apply
to them. For the pre-Directive EWCs this exemption relates both to the original
and the Recast Directive. For the Article 14.1b EWCs, the exemption is limited
to the rights and obligations of the Recast Directive. 
Notwithstanding this general lack of obligation to renegotiate agreements, the
EWC Recast does include some concrete situations in which a renegotiation is
obligatory (if demanded by either the employer or employee side). This
obligation is included in the so-called adaptation clause in Article 13 of the
Recast. This clause states that EWC agreements can be fully renegotiated
(including the establishment of a new Special Negotiation Body) when there
is a significant change in the company structure. It is also clear that this clause
applies to all EWCs, irrespective of whether they are pre-Directive, Article 6 or
Article 14.1b EWCs (European Commission 2010).
In essence, this adaptation clause gives a potential exit option for pre-Directive
EWCs in the event of mergers or acquisitions. If they invoke this clause, new
negotiations will start, leading eventually to an Article 6 EWC. For this reason,
Picard (2010) reasoned that ‘the adaptation clause is therefore likely to play a
unifying role in the future. As the business environment is constantly changing
(…) one can logically expect that Article 14 will over time become obsolete.
Agreements in force will have to be renegotiated under the terms of the new
EWC directive, thereby unifying the regimes applying to EWCs throughout
Europe.’
In this chapter both issues will be treated. In the first part, the evolution of the
EWC renegotiations will be inspected to identify whether or not the Recast
impelled EWCs to renegotiate or adapt their agreement. In the second part,
the focus will be on the transformation of EWCs and whether or not the
adaptation clause was effective in playing a ‘unifying role’.
1. Renegotiation of EWCs
Ever since there were EWC agreements, EWCs engaged in renegotiations and
amendments of the existing agreements. Although the Recast explicitly
mentioned that EWCs were not expected to renegotiate their agreement, it is
reasonable that a lot of EWCs would engage in such renegotiations in order to
align their EWC with the new rights and obligations that apply to them
(Eurofound 2015). 
For this reason, a visible increase in the amount of changed agreements is
expected in the aftermath of the Recast. Figure 5 shows the overall amount of
yearly agreements and amendments on the right axis (shaded area). The lines
and the left axis show the share of the types of agreements for each year. As
can be expected, in the early years almost 100% of the agreements established
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a new EWC. Over the years, the share of renegotiations and amendments rose;
yet important year-to-year fluctuations are present. 
During and after the Recast Directive the figures show a relatively high share
of amendments and renegotiations. Table 6 gives the averages of the period
before the Recast (2006-2008), the transition period (2009-2011) and the
post-Recast period (2012-2014). Clearly, the share of renegotiations and
amendments has risen in the transition and post-Recast period, in comparison
to the pre-Recast period. 
In total, 43 renegotiated EWC agreements and 145 amendments were
registered between 2009 and 2014. Compared to the amount of original
agreements, this was more than could have been expected, so it seems that the
Recast Directive did indeed lead to EWCs renegotiating or at least amending
their EWC agreements. The effect is limited, however, and does not take the
shape of a ‘wave of renegotiations’. 
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Table 6 Share of original agreements, renegotiations and amendments before,
during and after the Recast
2006-2008
2009-2011
2012-2014
Original
52%
35%
40%
Renegotiations
5%
15%
14%
Amendments
43%
50%
47%
Total
172
164
127
Figure 5 Original agreements, renegotiations and amendments 
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2. The use of the adaptation clause
While the Recast did not include an obligation to renegotiate agreements, it
did include a new and important article on renegotiations in the event of
significant restructuring. Article 13 of the Recast Directive states that in the
event of a significant change in structure, the EWC agreement can be
renegotiated, via a Special Negotiation Body. This clause covers all EWCs,
irrespective of whether they are pre-Directive, Article 6 or Article 14.1b EWCs
(European Commission 2010). 
2.1 Transforming EWCs
In total, the EWCdb registered 228 EWCs that transformed into other EWCs
because of mergers, acquisitions or changes of legal status (Table 7). The last
example refers to EWCs which changed because the company transformed into
an SE, or to EWCs which decided to change the legal status of their operation.
As can be seen in the table below, most that transformed into other EWCs are
pre-Directive EWCs which keep this status (38%) or Article 6 EWCs which
remain as such. About 19% change from a pre-Directive to an Article 6 EWC.
Interestingly, about 8% (19) of EWCs changed their status from an Article 6
into a pre-Directive EWC. These cases are generally take-overs in which a
standing Article 6 EWC is integrated into an older Article 13 EWC of the buying
company. In total, 4% (10) of EWCs changed their legal status from an Article
6 or pre-Directive EWC into an Art. 14.1b EWC during the second transition
period. Another 7% of the transformed EWCs (16) are EWCs which
transformed into SE Works councils. In five cases (2%), EWCs working under
the subsidiary requirements, or in companies that had an information and
consultation procedure, transformed into fully operative EWCs. 
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Table 7 EWC transformed bodies
Transformation
Pre - Pre
Pre - Art. 6
Art. 6 - Pre
Art. 6 - Art. 6
Pre - SE
Art. 6 - SE
Pre/Art. 6 - Art. 14.1b
Other
Total
Amount
86
49
19
43
11
5
10
5
228
Share
38%
21%
8%
19%
5%
2%
4%
2%
2.2 Convergence of EWCs
In theory, the inclusion of the adaptation clause in the Recast gives a potential
‘exit option’ for pre-Directive EWCs. In the event of a significant structural
change, the EWC can demand a full renegotiation of the EWC agreement by
an SNB. By definition, the resulting EWC will be an Art. 6 EWC and thus fully
covered by the Directive. This is why some expected this adaptation clause to
play a ‘unifying role’, with the idea that it would phase out the pre-Directive
EWCs (Picard 2010). 
If such convergence occurs, two patterns are likely to appear: (1) relatively less
EWCs will transform from Article 6 or pre-Directive EWCs into pre-Directive
EWCs and (2) relatively more EWCs will transform from pre-Directive EWCs
into Article 6 EWCs. These assumptions are made based on the fact that the
Recast allows the EWC to ‘opt out’ from the pre-Directive or Article 14.1b status
to an Article 6 EWC. 
Table 8 shows the share of transformed EWCs for the following periods: 2006-
2008 (pre-Recast), 2009-2011 (transition period) and 2012-2014
(post-Recast). Knowing that the total number of transformations in the period
between 2006 and 2014 is relatively low (48), the figures should be interpreted
with some caution. Moreover, given that during the transition period, 42% of
transformed EWCs became Article 14.1b EWCs, the pre- and post-Recast
figures should be compared. 
The table shows that relatively less EWCs transform from an Article 6 to a pre-
Directive body. At the same time, there is no change in the proportion of bodies
which change from pre-Directive EWCs into Article 6 EWCs. This proportion
remains relatively low (16%). Simultaneously, the amount of bodies
transforming from pre-Directive EWCs into other pre-Directive EWCs remains
very high (32%), while most of these bodies are theoretically able to invoke the
adaptation clause. 
The predicted ‘unifying role’ of Article 13 of the Recast can therefore not be
confirmed by the data. Although almost all transforming pre-Directive EWCs
have the theoretical option of invoking Article 13 of the Recast to remake their
EWCs (because the transformation is mostly related to a merger case), this
option is ignored by many. 
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Table 8 Transforming EWCs before, during and after the Recast
2006-2008
2009-2011
2012-2014
Pre-Directive to
pre-Directive
21%
13%
32%
Pre-Directive
to Art. 6
17%
17%
16%
Art. 6 to pre-
Directive
17%
8%
5%
Art. 6 to Art. 6
46%
21%
47%
Pre/Art. 6 to
Art. 14.1b*
n.d.
42%
n.d.
N
24
24
19
* A transformation of a body into an Art. 14.1b EWC was legally not possible before 2009. In theory it is possible in the post 2012 period; however,
we have no examples of such transformations.
2.3 Possible explanations
Although the adaptation clause gives EWCs the theoretical possibility to
demand a full renegotiation of their EWC agreement, and might therefore serve
as an ‘exit option’ for pre-Directive EWCs, the data on transformations shows
that its effects are limited. Nevertheless, many pre-Directive EWCs which
transform into other bodies (mostly at the event of a merger) retain a pre-
Directive status. 
While there is no systematic research into this question, some possible reasons
for the lack of a ‘unifying role’ in the application of the adaptation clause are
evident. For their explanation we can again use the framework presented in
Chapter 1 (Figure 6).
1. Knowledge: the adaptation clause is inserted in the Directive and
transposed into national law but might not be well known on the field.
2. Low perceived added value: Because the adaptation clause requires a
full renegotiation including an SNB (on request), it gives an ‘exit option’
to pre-Directive EWCs. It does not, however, guarantee that the outcome
will be more beneficial for the current EWC or employee representatives.
Well-established pre-Directive EWCs with good agreements might
therefore be wary of taking that risk.
3. High perceived costs: The use of the adaptation clause including the
establishment of a new SNB might be perceived as a highly complicated,
lengthy and resource-draining strategy. 
4. Management pressure: Even if the EWCs would find it useful to go
towards a full renegotiation, management pressures might obstruct this,
with the insistence that managing the merger is more pressing than
renegotiating the EWC agreement. Moreover, management pressure can
also be focused on keeping the pre-Directive status of the EWC.
5. Power dynamics between employees: In the case of a take-over, power
dynamics might be at play, obstructing a full use of the adaptation clause.
Specifically, the EWC of an acquiring firm might be keen on also
‘acquiring’ the EWC of the other company, even if that one is fully covered
by the Directive and the one of the acquiring firm is not. 
6. Legal clarity: The demand for a full renegotiation of the EWC can be
voiced in the event of a ‘significant change of structure’. What is to be
understood by this term is not entirely clear and greater specificity is
currently unavailable. Recital 40 of the EWC Recast Directive explains
that it might be a ‘merger, acquisition or division.’ However, the potential
coverage of the clause goes beyond these three examples. Even when a
company grows or shrinks excessively, extends towards different
countries or changes its activities, a significant change of structure could
be invoked. This might however be challenged by management.
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While the current adaptation clause allows for the theoretical possibility to fully
renegotiate an EWC in the event of a significant structural change, a multitude
of practical obstacles result in the limited use of this clause. The current legal
framework does not provide sufficient instruments to overcome these
obstacles. 
3. Conclusion
The EWC Recast Directive clearly excluded a general obligation to renegotiate
agreements to align the existing EWCs with the new rights and obligations.
Examination of the data shows the Recast did lead to a higher rate of
renegotiations during and after the Recast, but that the effect is relatively small
in scope and did not take the shape of a ‘wave of renegotiations’.
Although in general the Recast did not demand renegotiation of the EWC
agreements, in a specific case it does include an obligation (upon request from
either the employer or employees) to fully renegotiate the agreement. In the
event of significant changes in the company structure, the so-called ‘adaptation
clause’ provides for an obligatory full renegotiation. This clause was expected
to contribute to a certain convergence in the EWCs. This convergence, however,
did not materialize. Only a few EWCs transformed from pre-Directive to Article
6 EWCs. Surprisingly, some transforming pre-Directive EWCs did not grasp
the opportunity to renegotiate as an Article 6 EWC and retained their pre-
Directive status. For the time being, the adaptation clause of the Recast has
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Figure 6 EWC establishment 
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not been successful in supporting convergence. A multitude of obstacles to the
use of the adaptation clause are identified which are not (or insufficiently)
addressed by the current legal framework.
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Chapter 3: Better EWCs
Abstract 
The key purpose of the EWC Recast Directive was to improve the functioning of the
existing and future EWCs. For this, substantial revisions of the Recast included the right
to training, reporting back to employees and the involvement of trade unions, together
with amendments to the definitions of information, consultation and transnational. Using
data from almost 1,100 EWC agreements, this chapter evaluates the effect of the Recast
on the content of EWC agreements; it is expected the post-Recast agreements will be
more likely to include these issues than their pre-Recast counterparts. The results show a
combination of Recast effects with strong general learning effects in the negotiation and
renegotiation of EWC agreements. In general, the learning effects surpassed the policy
effects until policy caught up as a result of the Recast Directive. 
Notice
The numbers reported in this chapter focus on EWC agreements. They are therefore
fundamentally different from the figures reported in previous chapters or from those in
the recent ETUI publication titled: European Works Councils and SE Works Councils in
2015: Facts and figures. These focused on the characteristics of EWCs themselves. In
the Facts and figures publication, dissolved EWCs are excluded and the EWC charac -
teristics are sourced only according to their last (active) agreement.
With the launch of the 1994 Directive on European Works Councils, the EU
started an unprecedented experiment of developing a European policy on
social dialogue in European multinationals. Facing an enormous variety in
traditions and practices, the EU opted for a framework in which the company
level social partners have considerable autonomy in organizing the process.
Rules on minimum requirements and procedures were to guarantee good
processes and optimal outcomes.
Following decades of experience with EWCs, case studies, surveys and court
cases identified a number of best practices and major deficiencies (Lecher
1999; Lecher and Rub 1999; Weiler 2004; Marginson et al. 2013). After a long
political process, a Recast of the original EWC Directive was adopted in 2009.
One of its central objectives was to improve the functioning of the currently
existing and future EWCs, as clearly stated in Recital 7:
‘It is necessary to modernise Community legislation on transnational
information and consultation of employees with a view to ensuring the
effectiveness of employees’ transnational information and consultation
rights (…).’
To fulfil this goal, the Recast Directive included some minor and major changes
regarding: the definitions of crucial concepts, rights and obligations of the EWC
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and its members, stipulations necessary in EWC agreements, and the relation
between the EWC and other levels of employee participation. 
This chapter evaluates the extent to which the Recast Directive brought about
an ‘ensured effectiveness’ in EWCs. This evaluation builds on an extensive
study of evolving EWC agreements and focuses both on general learning and
policy effects. The chapter concludes that the Recast was only partially effective
in bringing about change. The areas in which it was not effective are also the
areas in which the Recast did not substantially outline measures and practices
to support the rules. This observation underscores the need for clear language
and instruments in legislation. 
1. Looking at agreements to evaluate the Recast
The architecture of the EWC regulation concedes a lot of freedom to the
employer and employee representatives to determine how their specific EWC
functions. This type of ‘regulated self-regulation’ was seen as necessary to
overcome the large differences in company-level social dialogue (Platzer 2002).
The EWC Directive and its Recast do not determine directly how EWCs should
function. They do determine the fundamental function of an EWC, some
essential rights and obligations and what should be agreed upon in the EWC
agreement.
The EWC agreement is the result of a negotiation process regulated by the
Directive and the Recast and is to determine in detail the competences,
composition and rules of operation of the EWC. By defining the process of
negotiation and some required basic content of the EWC agreement, the Recast
aims to have an impact on the functioning of the EWCs. 
This indirect impact of the Recast through the EWC agreements on the
functioning of the EWCs is clearly illustrated in Recital 19 of the Recast: 
‘In accordance with the principle of autonomy of the parties, it is for the
representatives of employees and the management of the undertaking or
the group’s controlling undertaking to determine by agreement the
nature, composition, the function, mode of operation, procedures and
financial resources of European Works Councils or other information and
consultation procedures so as to suit their own particular circumstances.’
Recitals 28, 29 and 30 specify further what the agreement should consist of
and what issues must be treated. 
Article 6 of the Recast Directive obliges the negotiating parties to agree on the
procedural aspects of the EWC, the ‘how’. This includes the composition of the
EWC, when to meet, where, under which conditions, who is covered by the
EWC etc. By altering the stipulations in Article 6, the Recast requires future
agreements (in Art. 6 EWCs) to mention and organize these aspects. 
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For some other issues, the Recast establishes the content of the EWC func -
tioning and some mutual rights and obligations. More specifically, the Recast
clearly defines what should be understood by ‘information’, ‘consultation’ and
‘the transnational competence’. Also, it stresses that employees have a right to
training and a right (and obligation) to inform the workforce about the process
and outcome of the EWC’s activities. 
To be really effective, arrangements need to be made on the practical exercise
of these rights, such as who is to pay for the expenses, how to go about it etc. In
future agreements or renegotiations, EWCs may wish to include clauses on the
practicalities related to the established rights. Similarly, although the definitions
included in the Recast directly apply to Article 6 EWCs, it may be a good idea
for agreements to mention them explicitly, in order to avoid confusion.
Figure 7 graphically illustrates the role of the EWC agreement in the
relationship between the Directive or its Recast and the EWC practice. For the
sake of completeness, this illustration also includes another step in the process:
the national transposition or implementation of the rules of the EWC Directive.
Because the EWC regulations are enforced through directives, they have to be
transposed into national legislation to be applicable. In this transposition, the
national legislator has the opportunity to further specify the rules of the
directive. In practice, however, analysis shows that these transpositions are
generally copy/paste exercises of the EWC Directive and rarely elaborate on
the rights, duties or means of the EWCs. If the national legislation diverges
from the EWC Directive it is generally because it omits certain clauses
(Jagodzinski 2015). 
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Figure 7 The role of the EWC agreement 
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As the EWC agreement plays a central role in the interface between regulation
and practice, one way of evaluating the effectiveness of the Recast is by looking
at the content of EWC agreements. More specifically, if the Recast Directive
had been effective, one could expect post-Recast agreements to be significantly
different from pre-Recast agreements, particularly when it comes to Article 6
EWCs.
Box 2 EWC agreements and EWC practice
While an inspection of evolutions in EWC agreements is a valid policy evaluation
strategy, it does not fully inform us of the impact of the Recast on the ‘effectiveness’ of
EWCs. This effectiveness is dependent on how the EWC functions in practice and not
only on how it should function according to the founding agreement. 
In practice, divergence occurs between the codified rules and the reality. EWCs might
meet more or less often, discuss issues not specified in the agreement or face a
management denying some resources to the representatives. By only looking at the EWC
agreements and all its clauses, one cannot obtain a full picture of the EWC operations.
Nevertheless, the EWC agreements are used here as a proxy for EWC operations, as they
outline the general framework in which an EWC should function. In the event of a
conflict, it will be the signed agreement that will be used as an ultimate reference, rather
than the developed practices. Moreover, in the event of a renegotiation such ‘developed
practices’ are included in the agreements. Evolved practices are likely to be reflected in
the agreements, taking into account a certain time lag. 
Furthermore, as Cremers and Lorber (2015: 86) rightly mention, the effectiveness of an
EWC is highly dependent on the relation of trust between the employee and employer
representatives and the management attitudes towards the councils. As they argue, a
clear agreement which specifies the mutual rights and obligations is essential in creating
a supportive managerial climate for the EWC. Similarly, Gilman and Marginson (2002)
concluded that ‘the terms of the agreement will configure but not determine the actual
practice of EWCs’.
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2. EWC Recast Directive – Hypotheses
The Recast Directive substantially altered some terms of the original Directive,
with the objective of ensuring the effectiveness of the information and
consultation rights on transnational issues. Some of these changes are
discussed below and concrete hypotheses are developed on how they are likely
to affect the content of EWC agreements.
2.1 Information and consultation: definitions
One of the clear changes implemented by the EWC Recast Directive is the
inclusion of clear definitions of what should be understood by ‘information’
and ‘consultation’. These definitions were included to respond to a lack of
clarity on what should be understood by the two terms and also to the several
court cases that resulted from this vagueness (Sachs-Durand 2010). The new
definitions of information and consultation are mentioned in Article 2.1: 
— Art. 2.1 (f): ‘“information” means transmission of data by the employer
to the employees’ representatives in order to enable them to acquaint
themselves with the subject matter and to examine it; information shall
be given at such time, in such fashion and with such content as are
appropriate to enable employees’ representatives to undertake an in-
depth assessment of the possible impact and, where appropriate,
prepare for consultations with the competent organ of the Community-
scale undertaking or Community-scale group of undertakings’
— Art. 2.1 (g): ‘“consultation” means the establishment of dialogue and
exchange of views between employees’ representatives and central
management or any more appropriate level of management, at such
time, in such fashion and with such content as enables employees’
representatives to express an opinion on the basis of the information
provided about the proposed measures to which the consultation is
related, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the management,
and within a reasonable time, which may be taken into account within
the Community-scale undertaking or Community-scale group of
undertakings’
An EWC is, however, free to specify a tailor-made definition of information
and consultation. As long as this specific definition does not infringe on the
rights of the employee representatives, EWC agreements might include more
specificity about the timing and content of information and consultation. As a
result of the EWC Recast, we thus expect more EWC agreements to mention
and specify clearly what should be understood by information and
consultation. 
Hypothesis 1:
Post-Recast EWC agreements will be more likely to include information and
consultation definitions than pre-Recast EWC agreements
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2.2 Select committees
A select committee mainly consists of a smaller group of EWC representatives
which usually takes charge of some coordinating and organizing tasks.
Depending on the agreement rules, they can also be given broader tasks of
receiving information, dissemination, calling extraordinary meetings etc.
In the original EWC Directive, select committees were only mentioned
indirectly. In the subsidiary requirements, the following mention was included:
‘Where its size so warrants, it shall elect a select committee from among its
members, comprising at most three members.’
The Recast Directive moved the requirement to decide about the establishment
of a select committee to Article 6, which states: ‘Without prejudice to the
autonomy of the parties, the agreement (…) shall determine: (…) where
necessary, the composition, the appointment procedure, the functions and the
procedural rules of the select committee set up within the European Works
Council’. Agreements made after the Recast are therefore, practically speaking,
obliged to specify whether or not they are establishing a select committee. As
a consequence, we can expect post-Recast agreements to be more likely to
include a select committee than pre-Recast agreements.
Hypothesis 2: 
Post-Recast EWC agreements will be more likely to have a select committee than
pre-Recast EWC agreements
2.3 Training
As the EWCs often discuss complex financial and economic issues, the
representatives need sufficient competences to realize the potential of an EWC
(Waddington 2010: 216). For this, training is required. Acknowledging this
point, the European Commission even opened budget lines for trade union-
initiated training activities. In the original Directive, no reference is made to
the need or right to training for EWC members. 
In the Recast, on the other hand, the need for training is expressed in both
Recital 33 and Article 10§4, which clearly establish the right of employees to
training without suffering any loss in earnings. According to the implementation
report of the commissions’ expert group, the costs of the training should, in
principle, be borne by the management (European Commission 2010). In order
to determine particular details, such as the types of training and the extent to
which employees have access to training, the EWC agreements need to include
some specifications. It is therefore assumed that post-Recast agreements will
be more likely to include clauses on training than pre-Recast agreements.
Hypothesis 3:
Post-Recast EWC agreements will be more likely to establish a right to training
than pre-Recast EWC agreements
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2.4 Articulation
For European-level employee involvement to be optimally effective, a certain
communication and linkage must exist between the national and European
levels of employee information and consultation. We here study three aspects
of the issue of articulation: (1) the definition of the transnational competence
of the EWC, (2) the right and duty to report back and (3) the right of employee
representatives to visit the company premises. 
2.4.1 Transnational competence
A first issue with regards to the relationship or articulation between the different
levels is the material competence of each level. As experience showed that fre-
quent discussion arose about what should be understood by ‘transnational com-
petence’, the Recast Directive included a more specific definition of this matter. 
According to Article 1.4, transnational competence is defined as follows: 
‘Matters shall be considered to be transnational where they concern the
Community-scale undertaking or Community-scale group of undertak -
ings as a whole, or at least two undertakings or establishments of the
undertaking or group situated in two different Member States.’
While a similar definition was already included in the subsidiary requirements
of the original Directive, the Recast moved this definition to the main body of
the Directive. The definition should be interpreted together with Recitals 12
and 16. To this effect, the European Commission’s evaluation roadmap (2016)
states: ‘The criterion used is that it is the potential effect of the subject that
should determine whether this is a EU-level or national-level subject.’
Yet again, this definition is in essence a minimum requirement which does not
affect the competence of the member states or the negotiating parties to
provide more extensive or detailed specifications of what should be understood
by ‘transnational competence’. An analysis of the national transpositions
nevertheless showed that the important recitals are often not transposed
(Jagodzinski 2015). 
Given that the Recast moved this definition to the core body of the text and
that the interpretation might differ depending on whether or not the recitals
are accounted for, post-Recast agreements are expected to be more likely to
include a specific definition of the transnational competence than pre-Recast
agreements. 
Hypothesis 4: 
Post-recast EWC agreements will be more likely include a definition of the
transnational competences than pre-recast EWC agreements
2.4.2 Reporting back 
The second issue regarding articulation refers to the communication between
employee representatives of the different levels. In this regard, the Recast
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Directive includes a right and obligation for the employee representatives to
inform the local representatives and employees of the content and outcome of
EWC operations in Article 10§2, and a mention of the importance of reporting
back in Recital 33. The study of the national transposition laws has shown that
this aspect of the Recast is not always reflected in national legislation
(Jagodzinski 2015) and that only in Lithuania was the duty to report back
further specified. 
In other words, it is up to the negotiating parties to agree and implement
procedures and practicalities on how to report back (De Spiegelaere and
Jagodzinski 2016). In line with the Recast, it is the employee representative’s
duty to report back, but this could well be combined with a parallel or joint
reporting from management. Post-Recast agreements may therefore be more
impelled to include clear clauses on reporting back than pre-Recast agreements. 
Hypothesis 5: 
Post-Recast EWC agreements are more likely to include the right and obligation of
employee representatives to report back than pre-Recast EWC agreements
2.4.3 Access to premises 
An essential means of establishing a good connection between the different
levels of employee representation is the right of EWC representatives to go and
visit the employees they represent in their work context. This right to access
the company premises is not mentioned explicitly in the Recast Directive, yet
can be derived from the specified right and obligation to report back. As Picard
(2010) mentions: ‘The duty (…) to report back to the employees they represents
implies that the management at all levels is under an obligation to provide
EWC members with the appropriate means of communication with the
workforce, including granting access to all company sites.’ The 2010 Expert
Report on the implementation of the Recast directive (European Commission
2010) made a similar evaluation: ‘It (reporting back) could entail the need for
EWC members to travel to local sites in order to report back to the workers’.
For such a right to be unequivocally established, an EWC report would need
to call attention to it and organize it. Given the implicit mention of it in the
Recast Directive, we expect to see more such clauses in post-Recast agreements
than in pre-Recast agreements.
Hypothesis 6:
Post-Recast EWC agreements will be more likely to include the right to access the
company premises than pre-Recast EWC agreements
2.5 Preparatory and debriefing meetings
For a qualitative information and consultation process, employees should be
able to meet with management to ask questions, receive information and be
consulted; but also to meet without management. Such internal meetings
should enable the representatives to discuss the issues and develop positions.
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In the original Directive, an employee-only preparatory meeting was included
in the subsidiary requirements. In the Recast Directive, this reference has not
been altered. At the same time, Article 5§4 on the negotiation process envisages
both a preparatory and debriefing meeting. 
A spillover effect from the functioning of the SNB to that of the EWC can be
expected, meaning that post-Recast agreements are more likely to include
preparatory and debriefing meetings than pre-Recast agreements.
Hypothesis 7:
Post-Recast EWC agreements will be more likely to allow for employee only
preparatory and debriefing meetings than pre-Recast EWC agreements
2.6 Trade union role
Negotiating and running an EWC requires a certain level of expertise and
experience. At the outset, this expertise is rarely available; experience with
different issues only accumulates slowly. Trade unions have experience and
expertise on these subjects and their positive role in the functioning of EWCs
has been widely acknowledged (European Commission 2008). In the Recast
Directive, the trade unions (and more specifically, the European Trade Union
Federations (ETUFs)) were given a larger role in the negotiation and estab -
lishment of EWCs in four ways:
1. In Article 5§4.3, the Directive stipulates that the SNB may request the
assistance of experts, which can include representatives of the ETUFs.
2. Article 5§4.3 gives the ETUF representatives the right to participate as an
advisor in the negotiation meetings (at the request of the SNB).
3. Article 5§2.c states that the ETUF should be informed of the composition
of an SNB and the commencement of negotiations. This should give them
the opportunity to better monitor the developments in the field and
approach the parties with their advice.
4. According to Article 4§4, management should communicate the required
information for the negotiations to all ‘parties concerned’, which includes
the trade unions (Picard 2010). 
It is clear that the Recast indirectly aims to stimulate trade union involvement
in EWCs. One way in which trade unions can be systematically involved in the
EWC functioning is by taking a trade union representative as a permanent
guest, member or expert in the EWC. The EWC Recast did not directly
stimulate this kind of involvement, yet we assume that if trade unions
participate more in the negotiations, they might at the same time develop their
function as permanent advisors. It is therefore expected that post-Recast
agreements will be more likely to include a permanent trade union guest in the
EWC than pre-Recast agreements.
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Hypothesis 8:
Post-Recast EWC agreements will be more likely to allow trade union
representatives to join the meetings than pre-Recast EWC agreements
2.7 Renegotiation and termination clause
In order to give employee representatives and management a way of regularly
updating the EWC agreement to accommodate evolving practices, legislation,
or company changes, the Recast included the following stipulation in Article
6.2(g): 
‘the date of entry into force of the agreement and its duration, the
arrangements for amending or terminating the agreement and the cases
in which the agreement shall be renegotiated and the procedure for its
renegotiation, including, where necessary, where the structure of the
Community-scale undertaking or Community-scale group of undertak -
ings changes’.
Supported also by Recital 28, this article requires agreements to be explicit on
how they can be modified or terminated, and which rules will apply in the event
of a renegotiation or termination. Accordingly, we expect to see relatively more
of such clauses in post-Recast agreements than in pre-Recast agreements.
Hypothesis 9:
Post-Recast EWC agreements will be more likely to have a renegotiation and
termination clause than pre-Recast EWC agreements
3. Data and method
3.1 Data
This chapter uses the EWC database, which is assembled by the European
Trade Union Institute (ETUI) and is the most comprehensive source on EWCs.
The EWC database comprises two elements: information on the number of
EWCs and the full text of EWC agreements. While these two elements are
clearly interlinked, the data does not always directly correspond. Each EWC
may be attached to more than one agreement: for example, an agreement
establishing the EWC as well as some renegotiated agreements. The research
for this paper was undertaken in January 2016 when the number of active
EWCs was 1,073, the number of EWC agreements was 2,003 and the number
of agreements used for the study was 1,078 (of which 107 were signed in the
post-Recast period). The agreements used for the analysis included complete
agreements - irrespective of whether they were the original or a renegotiated
document - signed between 1994 and 2014. EWC agreements based on the
subsidiary requirements are excluded from the analysis. Agreements concluded
before 1994 and after 2014 are also excluded as there are insufficient cases for
a reliable analysis. Similarly, agreements which are known but of which no full-
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text version is available are excluded. Based on a coding scheme devised by the
researchers, the full text of each EWC agreement has been coded, thus enabling
an assessment of the changing content of EWC agreements2. 
3.2 Modelling time
It is the objective of this article to study the effect of a policy intervention (the
EWC Recast) on the content of EWC agreements. For this, we study whether
post-Recast agreements are significantly different from pre-Recast agreements.
Policy is, however, not the only time-related factor that influences the content
of EWC agreements. As EWCs are designed according to the will (and
agreement) of the negotiating parties, this institution should be seen as an
‘institution in process’ (Waddington 2010). Its development is a constant
process and builds on internal EWC experience and the experience of other
EWCs, as well as on changes in policy. In earlier studies of EWC agreements,
strong learning effects were identified; learning effects which are partially
independent of regulatory policy interventions (Waddington 2010:56). Also in
longitudinal case studies of the EWCs, learning effects were observed
(Eurofound 2015). When studying the evolution over time of EWC agreements,
one therefore needs to account for both policy effects as well as general learning
effects. 
3.3 Control variables
In analysing the effect of the Recast on EWC agreements, several crucial
control variables should be accounted for, as they are likely to influence the
characteristics of the EWC agreements and equally related to our variable of
interest. Gilman and Marginson (2002) already studied the determinants of
EWC agreement content and distinguished between different influential
factors:
— A statutory effect referring to the degree to which an agreement has to
reflect the rules of the Directive. Here, the authors distinguished
between Article 13 and Article 6 agreements. 
— A learning effect referring to the overall tendency of some clauses to be
replicated between agreements. 
— A country effect referring to the idea that EWCs tend to partly resemble
the industrial relations traditions of the home country.
— A sector effect referring to the tendency of similar companies (of the
same sector) to agree on similar agreements. 
The analysis presented here builds on these insights in the selection of the
control variables, yet advances and extends this selection process: 
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2. For more details on the data used in this and other chapters, please refer to Annex 1. 
— As the regulatory framework differs, so the agreements may reflect
this differentiation. Clearly, the legal obligations of Article 6 agreements
are more extensive, making it more likely that these agreements will
have more stipulations regarding such obligations as training, reporting
back etc. Previous studies have already indicated such differences
(Carley and Marginson 2000) and as there is a direct relation between
the agreement period and the EWC type, including this control variable
is indispensable. 
— A second control variable is the sector in which the agreement is
established. While the EWC Directive covers companies from a certain
size in all sectors, most EWCs were first established in the metal and
chemical sectors. While these sectors accounted for almost three
quarters of all EWCs in 2002 (Kerckhofs 2002), they currently account
for just over half of all currently active EWCs (De Spiegelaere and
Jagodzinski 2015). The sector of establishment is most likely also related
to the characteristics of the agreement. For one, depending on the
sector, the EWCs are supported in their activities by different European
Trade Union Federations which may differ in their policies and
experiences (Waddington 2010). Secondly, as unionization and
organization rates differ by sector, so does the power balance between
the negotiating parties, which is likely to impact the negotiation
outcomes. 
— The third control variable is the company size. Again, this variable is
related to both the outcomes of our analysis and to the independent
variable (time). Over time, the proportion of EWCs established in large
companies (>10.000 employees in the EEA) tends to increase
(Kerckhofs 2002, 2006; De Spiegelaere and Jagodzinski 2015). At the
same time, company size tends to affect the EWC characteristics; a
recent Eurofound report (2015) shows that larger companies are more
likely to establish select committees. 
— The last control variable included is the headquarters country of the
company. EWCs tend to reflect national industrial relations traditions
(Eurofound 2015; Hertwig 2015). Proportionally, a large part of the
EWCs are established in companies headquartered in Germany, the US,
the UK and France, with minor evolutions over time in terms of
proportional spread. For this reason, four country clusters were
employed to assess the impact of the home country on agreements, in
relation to traditional differences in industrial relations regimes. First, a
cluster of Nordic countries was identified comprising of Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. Next, a cluster named
Coordinated Market Economies (CME) included Germany, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Austria, Luxemburg and Switzerland. The Mixed Market
Economies (MME) contained France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece.
The last cluster referred to Liberal Market Economies (LME) and
included the United Kingdom, Ireland, the United States, Canada,
Japan, the Central-East European countries and others.
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More details on these control variables and how they vary over time can be
found in Annex 2.
3.4 GEE modelling
Building on the data and hypotheses, we have a series of binary dependent
variables for which we want to estimate the effects of a series of mostly
categorical independent variables. These independent variables include a
continuous and a discrete time variable. The dataset has the following
characteristics: (1) it has a hierarchical structure as some agreements are
negotiated in the context of a single EWC (renegotiations) which violates the
assumption of independent observations; (2) notwithstanding the hierarchical
nature of the data, most observations are independent (only one agreement
for an EWC), (3) we work with both continuous and discrete time effects to
measure the overall learning effect and the policy effect and (4) the time
intervals are unequally spaced. 
Normal logistic regression analysis should not be used on this data given its
hierarchical structure. Multilevel logistic regression could be used, but would
provide us with subject-specific estimators. In this case, the estimates would
relate to the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, in a
specific EWC body. As EWC-level learning effects are not the focus of this
study, we have to use marginal models which provide population average
estimates, controlled for the correlation in the data because of the non-
independent character of some of the observations. 
Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) is such a method. In short, it
calculates the estimates of interest, while correcting for the non-independence
of the observations using working assumptions of how they correlate
(Molenberghs and Verbeke 2005: 151–161). Yet, even when the correlation is
misspecified (wrong working assumption), the estimates of the main effects
are consistent, making it a very fit method to study the population average
effect on longitudinal discrete data (Zeger and Liang 1986). 
In this study we use GEE estimation to analyse the relation between the inde -
pendent and dependent variables. The reported estimates use an exchangeable
working assumption and the standard errors are empirically corrected, or so-
called ‘sandwich estimator’ standard errors (Molenberghs and Verbeke 2005). 
4. Descriptive results
Table 9 shows the share of agreements including a certain clause or definition
and an illustration of the evolution of the yearly share of agreements over time.
Of all 1078 agreements under study, a large majority include a provision on a
select committee (88%) and a provision on reporting back to the workforce
(73%), include a renegotiation and termination clause (68%), and provide a
definition of what should be understood by the transnational competence
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(66%). More than half have a clause on training (58%) while the other variables
under study are overall less common. A guaranteed access to the company
premises is introduced in 12% and a trade union representative in 12%.
In Annex 2, the proportional difference is given depending on the headquarter
country of the company, the company size, the EWC type and the sector of
activity. The results in the annex show that the likelihood of an agreement
(including different clauses) is related to the sector, country and company size.
Some interesting patterns appear, yet any interpretation should take into
account that these proportions are very rough and might include important
composition effects (e.g. older agreements with specific characteristics are
overrepresented in the metal sector). 
For most variables there is a clear evolution over time. In Annex 2 and Table
3.1, the passage of time is illustrated using a graph plotting the yearly share of
agreements including a certain clause. The interpretation should be as follows:
of all agreements made in year X, Y% included a clause Z.
Regarding the information and consultation definitions, the share of
agreements including both definitions rises slowly and then takes a leap around
2007. For the definition of the transnational competence, the 1994 level was
already relatively high and rose rather erratically over time. For training, the
1994 share was very low, yet increased rapidly to about 60% and then even
further in the run-up to the Recast. For reporting back, the trend is less clear;
there seems to be a general yet erratic increase. 
Just as with the training clauses, the 1994 share of agreements providing access
to premises was very low but increased over time. However, the increase is
much weaker than in the training case and only reaches about 30-40% in
recent years. 
The evolution with regards to the select committees is very different. Already
in 1994 the share of agreements providing for them was higher than 50% and
quickly increased to over 80%. In recent years, virtually all concluded
agreements have a select committee. 
The inclusion of a trade union representative was not very widespread in the
early years and does not seem to increase significantly over time. Finally, the
inclusion of a renegotiation and termination clause increased in the first
period, after which it stabilized at around 70%.
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5. Multivariate results
To identify specifically the effect of the Recast, a multivariate GEE analysis is
performed for all the nine clauses which are likely to be stimulated by the
Recast. Table 10 contains the results of the different models. In essence, these
models aim to identify different possible patterns over time in order to
establish whether or not the Recast had an observable effect on the content of
agreements. These different patterns are illustrated in Figure 8.
— Boosted learning occurs when the Recast reinforces a pre-existing
learning effect.
— Simple improvement occurs when there is a Recast effect but no
general learning effect. 
— Simple learning occurs when there is a learning effect and no Recast
effect.
— No effect occurs when there is neither a learning effect nor a Recast
effect.
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Table 9 Overall presence and time-trend
Variable
1 Information and consultation definitions
2 Select committee
3 Right to training
4 Definition of the transnational competence
5 Reporting back
6 Access the company premises
7 Preparatory and debriefing meetings
8 Trade union representative
9 Renegotiation and termination clause
Proportion present
22%
88%
58%
66%
73%
12%
40%
12%
68%
Descriptive timetrend
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Table 10 gives the results of the multivariate GEE analysis. This analysis filters
out the overall evolution in agreement characteristics, controlling for
differences depending on company and EWC features. The table gives the odds
ratios, the standard errors and significance levels for the different variables
included in the model. The odds ratios measure the difference (increase/
decrease) in the odds (ratio of the probability that an event occurs, to the
probability that it does not) of a particular clause being included in an
agreement; depending on different variables and in comparison with a given
reference group. An odds ratio of more than one signals that agreements with
a certain characteristic are more likely to have, for example, a training clause
than agreements from a reference group. An odds ratio of one signals that there
is no difference and an odds ratio of less than one signals that agreements from
that group have lower odds of inclusion than the reference group. 
The results largely confirm the importance of the company- and EWC-related
control variables. The odds of having a clause on reporting back, access to
premises, trade union representatives and a preparatory and debriefing
meeting differ significantly depending on the sector of activity. In general,
agreements from the metal sector are more likely to include a clause on
reporting back and providing access to premises, but also less likely to provide
for preparatory and debriefing meetings or trade union representatives. 
As for the country clusters, the model identifies significant differences for
almost all variables except for the select committee. Without going into detail,
agreements from companies headquartered in Coordinated Market Economies
and Liberal Market Economies3 tend to diverge. Company size plays a minor
Figure 8 Different patterns 
Recast
e ect
General learning e ect No general learning e ect
No
Recast
e ect
100%
1994 2014
0%
Boosted learning
100%
1994 2014
0%
Simple improvement
100%
1994 2014
0%
No e!ect
100%
1994 2014
0%
Simple learning
Recast Recast
RecastRecast
3. For a detailed list of countries allocated to those clusters, please see Annex 1: Data used. 
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role, with agreements from large companies being more likely to have a
training clause. 
Of specific interest is the influence of the regulatory status of an EWC. Even
when controlling for the country, cluster, date of establishment and company
size, there are still significant differences between agreements made in pre-
Directive, Article 6 and Article 14.1b EWCs. Compared to agreements made in
Article 6 EWCs, those made in pre-Directive EWCs are significantly less likely
to include definitions of information, consultation or the transnational
competence, and are less likely to include clauses on reporting back.
Conversely, they are more likely to provide for a trade union representative.
The regulatory status of the EWCs is thus still an important issue and
continuous to affect the quality of the EWC agreements.
To facilitate the interpretation of the two time-related variables of interest,
Figure 9 shows the evolution over time of the predicted probabilities based on
the model, as suggested by Agresti (2007) and Powers and Xie (1999). These
figures neatly reflect the patterns discussed earlier. 
Information and consultation definitions: boosted learning.
According to the model, the probability that an agreement includes definitions
of information and consultation is subject to a clear learning effect. With every
passing year, the share of agreements including both definitions rises. At the
time of the Recast, the probability further increases, reflecting a boosted
learning pattern. The prior legal problems regarding the exact definition of
information and consultation has probably contributed to the general learning
effect, while the Recast effect can be explained by the up-front position of the
new definitions in the Recast and the importance attached to the new
definitions by trade unions. Currently, virtually all recently signed EWC
agreements include such definitions.
Select committees: no effect. For select committees, the pattern is
remarkable. From the outset, the establishment of a select committee was
included in the original Directive’s subsidiary requirement, leading to a high
initial estimated probability of inclusion of over 80%. Over the years, this
probability increased further; yet, given the initially high probability, the
increase is statistically insignificant. Moving this option to the core text in the
Recast did not, either, lead to a significant increase of the probability of
inclusion. There is, in summary, no effect.
Training clauses: simple learning. The pattern regarding training clauses
is different as the model shows a clear learning effect, but no observable Recast
effect. Although only few agreements included training rights in the beginning,
the share of agreements providing training grew fast over the years to arrive
at a (predicted) probability of about 85% in 2009. The Recast Directive, which
established a right to training for all EWC representatives, did not affect this
share in a significant way. This simple learning pattern can be explained by the
fact that both employers and employees quickly recognized the added value of
training and started including such a right in their agreements. At the time of
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the Recast, the probability of inclusion was already high enough to make an
additional increase difficult to realise. The Recast in this case merely affirmed
existing practices, rather than changed them. 
Definition of the transnational competence: simple improvement.
For the definition of the transnational competence of the EWC, the model
shows a clear effect of the Recast Directive, but no general learning effect. This
pattern of simple improvement can be explained by the fact that a lot of
agreements already included a definition of the transnational competence from
the outset, as this concept is essential in defining the scope of activities of an
EWC. Since the EWC Recast proposed a new definition, relatively more
agreements started to include one in their agreements. 
Reporting back: simple improvement.Regarding the inclusion of clauses
on reporting back the pattern is one of simple improvement. Just as with the
definitions of the transnational competence, the probability of inclusion was
initially already relatively high. Over time, this probability did not change but
increased with the Recast. Forging connections with the other levels of
employee representation is essential for the good functioning of an EWC, and
the need to inform the workforce was therefore included in the initial
subsidiary requirement. Already in the early periods, therefore, this gave way
to a relatively high probability of inclusion. The mention of this right in the
core text further increased the probability of inclusion to almost 90% in new
EWC agreements.
Access to premises: simple learning. As a guaranteed access to premises
is not explicitly mentioned in either the original or the Recast Directive, the
model shows that the initial probability of inclusion is rather low. There is,
however, an overall increasing trend in the probability of inclusion which is
unaffected by the Recast. This pattern of simple learning seems to be
interrupted during the transition period (2009-2011) where the estimated
probability decreases sharply. However, as the number of agreements in that
period is relatively low, this decrease is only marginally statistically significant
and is undone by the subsequent increase in the predicted probability in the
post-2011 period. Obviously, the implicit means of including this right in the
directives did not translate into a greater exercise of this right in practice.
However, over time, the probability of inclusion increases, suggesting that the
negotiating parties see such a right as instrumental for the effective and
independent functioning of an EWC.
Preparatory and debriefing meeting: simple learning. The pattern
with regards to the inclusion of preparatory and debriefing meetings is one of
simple learning. With every passing year, the probability that an agreement
includes the right to have both preparatory and debriefing meetings increases
distinctly. With the Recast, the estimated probability changes, but the estimate
is not statistically significant. There is, in other words, no significant difference
in the probability of an agreement providing for preparatory and debriefing
meeting between the pre-Recast and the transition or post-Recast period. The
projected spillover of a practice established in the SNB to the EWC did not
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therefore occur. Part of the explanation might be that even before the Recast,
the predicted probability was already relatively high, leaving only limited room
for improvement. 
Trade union representatives: simple learning. For the inclusion of
trade union representatives the model shows a slow learning curve. In the
transition period, the likelihood dropped significantly, but recovered
afterwards. There is no Recast effect. The four ways in which the Recast tried
to stimulate trade union involvement in EWCs did not result in more trade
union representatives as permanent guests at EWC meetings. 
Renegotiation and termination clauses: no effect. According to the
model, the likelihood that an agreement includes a renegotiation and
termination clause is not subject to a general learning effect nor a Recast effect.
The modelled probability fluctuates at around 60-70%. Already before the
Recast, a majority of EWCs saw the use of including clauses on how to
terminate and amend the agreement. The fact that the Recast added this as an
official requirement for an EWC agreement did not significantly raise the
number of EWC agreements including such clauses.
6. Discussion
The primary interest of this research is the question of whether or not the policy
intervention of the EWC Recast had any observable effect on the agreement
content. As we know from the literature and past research, policy is not the
only time-related variable that is likely to affect the agreements’ content. A
general learning effect was already identified, as EWC agreements build on
experiences and innovations of previous EWC agreements and incorporate
them. These two effects have been modelled as a linear ‘learning effect’ and a
discrete ‘Recast effect’, distinguishing between different relevant policy
periods. Combining our two time-related variables, four patterns appear. 
6.1 Boosted learning
For only one variable, a genuine boosting effect was identified in which both a
learning as well as a Recast effect is present: this is the inclusion of definitions
of information and consultation. The likelihood that agreements mention clear
definitions of information and consultation is growing over time, but with the
EWC Recast Directive this growth curve was given an extra boost. The need
for clear definitions was clearly accepted as a best practice that was
proliferating, but the fact that the Recast included clear definitions gave a
serious boost to the likelihood of EWC agreements including such definitions.
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The Recast boosted the
inclusion of information and
consultation definitions in the
EWC agreements.
100%
1994 2014
0%
Recast
6.2 Simple improvement
For two other variables we observe a simple improvement effect; while there
is no general learning effect, the Recast positively affected the likelihood of
inclusion. This is the case for the inclusion of definitions of transnationality
and the right and obligation of employee representatives to report back about
the EWC activities. Regarding the reporting back, we observe that the
probability of an agreement including such a clause was already an estimated
70%; yet with the Recast, this probability increased to about 90%. As for the
definitions of transnationality, a similar pattern is observed. The probability
was stable at around 65% and due to the Recast Directive, increased to about
85%.
6.3 Simple learning
For most other variables the Recast did not affect a pre-existing learning trend
and just affirmed an existing reality of proliferating best practices. This is the
case for the existence of training rights, the provision of a right to visit the
company premises, the possibility to hold preparatory and debriefing meetings
and the inclusion of a trade union representative in the EWC meetings. 
For training rights and preparatory and debriefing meetings, most agreements
signed just before the Recast already included such clauses, leaving very little
room for improvement. 
For the inclusion of trade union representatives and the provision of
guaranteed access to premises, there is still much room for improvement.
However, the Recast did not affect the general learning effect, which just
continues after the Recast. 
6.4 No effect
For two variables - the inclusion of renegotiation and termination clauses and
the presence of a select committee - we observed neither a general learning
effect nor a policy effect. 
Although the inclusion of such clauses was not mandatory in the pre-Recast
period, many agreements did include them. In the post-Recast period,
agreements are obligated to include them and yet there has been no substantial
increase in the proportion of agreements that do so.
The same goes for the select committee. Even though the select committee was
only mentioned in the subsidiary requirement in the original directive, this
practice spread very quickly in all EWC agreements. Even long before the
Recast, virtually all (re)negotiated agreements included a select committee.
Also on this point, the Recast only affirmed existing practices. 
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The Recast Directive increased
the likelihood that definitions
of transnationality and clauses
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in EWC agreements; this likeli -
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independent of the Recast. 
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6.5 Recast vs. self-regulation
An EWC agreement defines the contours in which the EWC will function. It
defines a set of procedures, engagements, rights and obligations within the
framework of the law. The EWC regulation is an example of ‘regulated self-
regulation’. Our analysis of EWC agreements’ content over time shows the clear
presence of a strong learning effect in the content. Through experience and
copying best practices, providing training to employee representatives quickly
spread, just as providing definitions of information and consultation and giving
the employee representatives the opportunity to have employee-only
preparatory and debriefing meetings did. 
One major group of actors in this learning process are the European Trade
Union Federations (ETUFs). Through their policy of assigning national or
European trade union coordinators to EWCs, they enable and stimulate mutual
learning. These coordinators are frequently responsible for more than one
EWC and organize through coordinator network meetings (Waddington 2010;
Rüb and Platzer 2015). This, together with the centrally developed guidelines,
guidebooks and toolboxes for EWCs, is most likely one of the major
explanations for the observed strong learning effect.
As a consequence of this strong learning effect, some practices were relatively
widespread in EWC agreements, even before there was any discussion of a
recast of the Directive. There was accordingly little room for improvement and
therefore the Recast did not affect the share of agreements that included a
select committee or training rights. Here, the changes of the Recast reflected
an already omnipresent reality.
The Recast introduced some different requirements for EWC agreements. As
a result, EWC agreements did start to include more definitions of information,
consultation and the transnational competence of the EWC, as well as
specifications on the right to report back. Here the Recast was a reality-
changing policy. It either strengthened existing learning curves (e.g. regarding
the inclusion of information and consultation definitions) or simply increased
the likelihood of inclusion (transnational competence definition and reporting
back). 
Both the regulatory and the self-regulatory aspect are thus effective in some
fields. At the same time, both aspects are equally ineffective in stimulating the
spread of some other practices. The clearest example is the possibility for a
trade union representative to join the EWC meetings as a permanent guest.
Although trade union involvement is considered positive for the functioning
of an EWC, a limited learning effect is observed. Despite the Recast declaring
it as an objective to stimulate trade union involvement, there is no significant
increase in the amount of agreements providing for such a permanent
representation. The same goes for employee access to premises. Although there
is a small learning effect with more and more agreements providing for such a
guaranteed access, the Recast did not manage to encourage the spread of this
practice. 
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The explanation is probably related to the way in which the Recast tried to
boost trade union involvement and guarantee access to premises. In both cases,
the rules are not clear or significant. For union involvement, the Recast only
demanded that they would be informed about the start of negotiations.
Regarding access to premises, this option was not even mentioned in the Recast
but was considered a logical consequence of the duty to inform the local
representatives and the need for the managers to provide sufficient means to
the EWC representatives to fulfil their obligations. This implicit inclusion in
the regulatory framework is evidently not a game changer and does not lead
to a significant shift in the content of EWC agreements. 
6.6 Continuing legacy of the first transition period
In comparing EWC agreements, this study also controlled for possible
differences between agreements made in EWCs functioning under different
legal frameworks. As pre-Directive EWCs are exempted from the rules of the
Directive, agreements made in such EWCs are likely to be less affected. The
model presented confirms this. With regard to the inclusion of definitions of
information and consultation, the definition of transnational matters and
clauses on reporting back, there is a marked difference. Agreements from pre-
Directive EWCs are less likely to include such clauses. However, when it comes
to trade union representatives, pre-Directive agreements are more likely to
provide for them. This last observation can be explained by the need for such
a pre-Directive EWC to cover the whole workforce. One frequent way of doing
so (in the absence of a formally organised SNB) was by negotiating with the
present trade unions, rather than with an ad-hoc negotiation committee. 
6.7 Non-observable Recast effects
This chapter focused on the observable Recast effects by comparing EWC
agreements from different periods. In this exercise it is assumed that the
changes made in the Recast should be reflected in proportionally more EWC
agreements that include certain clauses, rights or definitions. This study found
only a few observable Recast effects. However, for several reasons, this does
not entirely exclude the possibility that the Recast had an effect.
First of all, some agreements negotiated just before the Recast was concluded
and implemented might have renegotiated their agreement in the shadow of
the law. In this case they would have already taken into account upcoming legal
changes in their current agreement. Such anticipated alignment might mask
some of the Recast effects.
Second, and more importantly, this study is focused on EWC agreements, with
the recognition that many EWCs have never renegotiated their agreements;
for these, the effect of the Recast is therefore by definition non-observable.
However, the rights and obligations stemming from the Recast directly apply 
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to these EWCs (if they are Article 6 EWCs) even when they haven’t renego -
tiated their agreement. 
7. Conclusion
This chapter focused on the question of whether or not the Recast led to the
development of better EWCs. In evaluating this question, it searched for
observable effects of the Recast regarding the changing content of EWC
agreements. In doing so, this study controlled for possible intervening effects
(country, sector etc.) and also included a general learning effect. 
The results show that for most included variables which the Recast aimed to
affect, no observable Recast effect could be established. For some variables,
this was mostly due to the presence of strong learning effects, which resulted
in very limited room for improvement at the time of the Recast. In these areas
(training, select committee and preparatory and debriefing meetings) the
Recast merely affirmed existing practices.
On some other points, the Recast did have an observable effect: namely, the
inclusions of definitions of information, consultation and transnational
matters, and clauses on reporting back to the employees. Elsewhere, there was
no such effect but still clear room for improvement. More specifically, the
inclusion of trade union representatives in the EWC meetings and the
guaranteed access to company premises is unaffected by the Recast but not yet
very widespread. The absence of clear instruments in the Recast to promote
these aspects can be identified as the major cause. 
Overall, the Recast reflected the lowest common denominator more than the
best practices. This observation is shared by various other studies using
different methodologies. Kerckhofs (2015), for example, presented a similar
conclusion based on several longitudinal case studies. Waddington et al.
(2016), meanwhile, interviewed managers, similarly demonstrating how the
Recast introduced rights and practices which were already common and
therefore did not affect the functioning of the EWCs.
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General conclusion
This report aimed to evaluate the EWC Recast Directive. In doing so, the report
focused on the two main objectives of the Recast, namely: (1) to stimulate the
creation of more EWCs and (2) to enhance the effectiveness of existing and
future EWCs. By building on data from the most comprehensive database of
EWC agreements, an evaluation was made of how effective the Recast has been
in delivering on its declared objectives.
While the Recast Directive was a clear improvement on the previous Directive
and contributed to the legal certainty in several ways, the overall conclusion
of this evaluation exercise is that the Recast was in most respects too little, too
late for enabling the establishment of more and better EWCs.
1. More EWCs 
Based on results of this research, the Recast Directive was found to be
ineffective in stimulating the creation of more EWCs. Both during the second
transition period and in the post-Recast period, the number of newly created
EWCs declined and continues to do so. This decline in the growth rate is
unlikely to be caused by a saturated population or by the presence of alternative
ways of organizing transnational information and consultation.
The legal instruments provided by the Recast to boost the establishment of
new EWCs (a transition period, information to trade unions and clarification
on who should give the necessary information for the negotiations) can be
rightly considered ineffective and insufficient. 
Future policy interventions should focus on increasing the overall awareness
of the possibility to establish EWCs, spreading information on which
companies are eligible to organize an EWC, and providing resources for the
initial phases of negotiation. Capacity building of trade unions and (national)
employee-representation structures could help to boost the creation of new
EWCs, as could the establishment of an EU-level database on companies.
2. Adapting EWCs
Although the Recast aimed to affect the functioning of both present and future
EWCs, it explicitly ruled out an obligation for EWCs to renegotiate their
agreements. The figures show that there was a slight increase in renegotiations
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and amendments in the post-Recast period but that there was no great ‘wave’
of renegotiations as had been expected. 
One possible explanation is the fact that the new rules applied directly to all
(Art. 6) EWCs. Another is that a lot of the changes introduced by the Recast
were already present in most of the recently established or renegotiated
agreements. In these cases there was no clear need for a renegotiation or
amendment. 
The Recast also provides for an obligation to fully renegotiate the EWC
agreement in the event of ‘significant structural changes’ in the company. If
demanded by the employees, the renegotiation should entail the creation of a
new SNB and thus lead to a brand new EWC. This so-called adaptation clause
was expected to serve as a converging factor and an opportunity of
transformation for pre-Directive EWCs which are still not covered by the rules
of the initial Directive or the Recast. Such a convergence, however, did not
materialize. Few EWCs have transformed from pre-Directive into normal
Article 6 EWCs.
The ineffectiveness of the adaptation clause could have been caused by a
multitude of reasons, such as: little knowledge of the existence of this clause,
limited legal clarity on what ‘significant change of structure’ means, other
priorities for employee representatives and management in the event of a
merger, power dynamics, high perceived costs and low perceived added value.
These obstacles are in no way addressed by the Recast or the national
implementation laws, leading to a limited use of the adaptation clause. Future
policy interventions should focus on making the adaptation clause fit the reality
of constant restructuring. 
A consequence of the limited effectiveness of the adaptation clause is the fact
that a considerable number of the EWCs continue to be pre-Directive EWCs
and thus not fully covered by the Recast. This undermines the ability of any
regulation to influence the content of EWC agreements. Our study indeed
shows that agreements made in pre-Directive EWCs remain less complete and
advanced than in the others. 
Future legislation should avoid creating even more exemptions and transition
periods and instead work towards a unified framework for all employee rights
to transnational information and consultation.
3. Better EWCs
Through the comparison of agreements from different periods, this report
studied the contribution of the Recast to creating better EWCs. The report
focused on the following agreement characteristics: information and consul -
tation definitions, presence of a select committee, training clauses, definition
of the transnational competence, clause on reporting back, access to company
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premises, preparatory and debriefing meetings, presence of a trade union
representative and the inclusion of renegotiation and termination clauses. 
The results of the study show that a Recast effect was observed for only three
of these characteristics: information and consultation definitions, definition
of the transnational competence and the presence of a clause on reporting back.
In the case of the first characteristic, the Recast boosted an existing general
learning effect; while for the other two, there was no observable learning effect
and the Recast therefore played a role in improving the situation. 
For all the other variables, a Recast effect could not be observed. In most cases
there was, however, a strong learning effect. In the case of the select committee
and the training clauses the limited room for improvement explains the
absence of a Recast effect. On these topics the Recast merely affirmed the fact
that in virtually all recent EWC agreements these aspects are already included. 
For the inclusion of clauses on trade union representatives and giving
employees access to the company premises, no Recast effect was observed
(although there remains great potential for improvement). Clearly, the implicit
way in which they were included in the Recast was not effective in boosting
their inclusion in EWC agreements.
4. Learning and policy
One of the major explanations for the limited effect of the Recast Directive on
the content of EWC agreements is the observed strong learning effects which
left only limited room for improvement. Learning effects in many ways
surpassed policy effects, which only caught up by means of the Recast. This
can be explained in two ways.
One the one hand, learning in EWCs was particularly strong. Thanks to the
efforts of the European Trade Union Federations in providing coordination for
EWCs’ negotiation and practice, and for the development of specialized
training courses, some practices proliferated very quickly. 
On the other hand, policy is particularly weak. In many cases, the Recast only
stipulates what should be regulated but does not prescribe the content or
specific solutions. There are very little monitoring and even less administrative
sanctioning policies organized to enforce compliance. This, together with a
policy that mostly reflects the most common and already accepted practices,
reduces the potential for strong policy effects.
5. The future
Future policy intervention should provide real resources and incentives for the
creation of more and better EWCs. From this evaluation study we identify five
areas of progress to be made:
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1. Policy which drives proactive innovation: instead of reflecting
commonly accepted practices, policy should stimulate less commonly
employed good practices to really upgrade the functioning of the average
EWC.
2. Rights and levers to use them: establishing a certain right (e.g.
renegotiation in case of structural change) without providing the
necessary instruments to make these rights effective in practice should
be avoided. Rights should be combined with effective resources to
overcome common obstacles.
3. Focus on capacity building: if policy aims to promote the establishment
of more EWCs, it should focus on building up the capacity of the partners
to make good use of the EWC (added value), but also ensure their capacity
to negotiate an agreement. Here, investment in trade union organization
and local information and consultation institutions is essential.
4. Knowledge and information: another major obstacle to the
establishment of more EWCs and the effective use of the rights at hand is
the limited knowledge of existing rules, and insufficient information on
which companies are covered by the Directive (i.e. lack of a company
registry). 
5. Monitoring of formal compliance of EWC agreements could be
developed in order to reduce the legal uncertainty arising from the
diversity in legal arrangements, itself being a consequence of the policy
of regulated self-regulation.
6. Clarity in objectives: certain objectives of the Recast (e.g. stimulating
trade union involvement) were included implicitly. Naturally, the
effectiveness of these policy interventions is very limited. If policy aims
to stimulate certain practices, these objectives should be clearly included
in the legal texts and backed by robust provisions.
Beyond the potential areas of progress identified by this evaluation exercise,
improvements in other fields (not included in this study) might still be
required. These involve, among others: clarifying the legal obligations of the
employers when the subsidiary requirements apply; further clarifying the
cooperation and coordination between different levels of employee
involvement (articulation); regulating the scope and limits of confidentiality
arrangements; guaranteeing effective enforcement of rules, including
provisions for sanctioning; regulating the access of EWCs to courts; and many
more. 
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Table 11 Relation to the European Commission’s roadmap (European Commission 2016)
Question from the European Commission’s roadmap
For the compliance: 
To what extent is the transposition of the new rules correct at national
level? 
What are the main issues/aspects of the Directive that remain or have
emerged as recurrent problematic or contentious issues at national and
European levels or in their articulation? 
For the effectiveness :
In what respect/to what extent does the Directive – the 'new rules' –
bring a new impetus to consultation and dialogue in transnational
companies, in particular as regards the opening and process of the
negotiations …
… the enhanced role of trade unions and employers' organisations,
… the new concepts of information and consultation?
How many agreements [EWCs in ETUI’s vocabulary] are still not ruled
by the Recast Directive because of the derogations foreseen in its
Article 14? 
How many agreements apply the subsidiary requirements?
How is the new right for employees' representatives to benefit from
training without loss of salary implemented in practice? 
To what extent has the role of EWCs increased in the negotiation,
implementation and monitoring of transnational company agreements?
What is the specific effect of the recast against the prevailing economic
context? 
Against the baseline situation (2009), what is the impact of the
Directive on the creation or the absence of EWCs in their various
contexts (companies/ sectors/ countries) as well as the reasons for this? 
How many EWC agreements were concluded or renegotiated during the
reference period (5 June 2009 – 5 June 2011)? 
What are the current main characteristics of the EWCs: composition,
number of meetings, existence of select committees and of working
groups? 
Answer based on this report
Not provided
Not provided
The Recast did not lead to a new wave in the
establishment of EWCs. The declining growth rate
persisted. 
The Recast did not lead to a significant increase in
the representation of members of European or
national trade unions in EWCs. 
The Recast did significantly increase the probability
that an EWC agreement includes specific
definitions of Information and Consultation.
42% (395) of all active EWCs are still functioning
as pre-directive EWCs. An additional 3% (31) are
functioning as article 14.1b EWCs. 
12 EWCs are currently registered as functioning
under the subsidiary requirements. Some more
might not be registered in the database and it is
unclear whether they function well.
The Recast did not significantly change the
probability that an EWC agreement will include a
clause on training. Over time, however, this
probability increased significantly and in the period
preceding the Recast it reached almost 100%
Not provided
Not provided
The Recast did not lead to a new wave in the
establishment of EWCs. Essentially, the Recast did
not provide sufficient instruments and levers to
overcome known obstacles.
In the second transition period, 83 agreements
were signed. 46 were small amendments or
extensions of existing agreements. 28 created new
EWCs and 9 were renegotiations. However, only 31
EWCs can be considered as art 14.1b EWCs as the
other explicitly ruled out that possibility. 
The main characteristics of the currently active
EWCs are discussed in the 2015 Facts and Figures
publication
Part
Not provided
Not provided
Chapter 1
Chapter 3,
part 2.6 and 5
Chapter 3,
part 2.1 and 5
Introduction,
part 2.2
Introduction,
part 2.2
Chapter 3,
part 2.3 and 5
Not provided
Not provided
Chapter 1
Introduction,
part 2.2
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Question from the European Commission’s roadmap Answer based on this report Part
For the efficiency: 
How did the transposition of the new rules of the Directive, including
the new right for training, affect the benefits and costs for workers and
for companies? 
How did the recast simplify administrative burden?
For the relevance : 
To what extent do national laws reflect similar or provide for more
protective conditions for workers than the Directive's improved
information and consultation rights for employees? 
What are the effects on legal certainty and clarity resulting from some
of its provisions, like the adaptation clause or the definition of
transnationality, or the absence of certain provisions, like on a clear
articulation between national and European information and
consultation procedures? 
In particular how does it impact on the enforcement of rights by the
courts? What is the quantitative and qualitative dimension of litigation
or complaints and debates in the Member States? What is the impact of
the new competence of the members representing the employees on
the EWC to represent the employees of the undertaking or group of
undertakings? 
For the coherence : 
To what extent is the Directive coherent with other EU legislation
addressing workers' information and consultation rights, notably with
the Article 27 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights? 
For the EU added value
The Directive 2009/38 on the establishment of European Works
Council has a genuine EU specificity as 6 EWCs are transnational bodies
representing employees of companies established in at least two
Members States. Based on the assessment of the above criteria,
conclusions will be made notably on the coordination gains, legal
certainty and ensuring minimum rights of the workers in terms of
information and consultation of employees via the EWCs.
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided
Annex 1: Data used
1. Data 
The data used in this study is taken from the EWC database (EWCdb),
managed by the ETUI (European Trade Union Institute). The database
includes information on EWCs, EWC agreements and multinational companies
with EWCs. In the general absence of an exhaustive dataset of all EWCs, the
EWCdb has the most comprehensive set of EWC agreements to be found. 
1.1 Level of analysis
When studying EWCs, one can focus on different levels of analysis, depending
on the research question of interest. If one is to describe the current situation
with regard to EWCs (as is typically done in the EWC Facts and Figures series
(Kerckhofs 2002, 2006; De Spiegelaere and Jagodzinski 2015), the level of
analysis constitutes the EWCs that are currently active. 
In Chapters 1 and 2 of this report, we do not focus on the current population
of EWCs but on the population of all EWCs (active and dissolved). For Chapter
3, the level of analysis is the individual EWC agreement. 
1.2 EWC agreement population selection
In January 2016, a total of 2003 agreements were registered in the EWCdb.
Not all these agreements are used in the subsequent analysis. The analyses in
Chapter 3 are based on a sub-section of the whole population. 
The criteria for the identification of this sub-population are: 
— Full agreements: original installation agreements, extensive renego -
tiations and post-merger agreements
— Negotiated EWCs: excluding EWCs established on the subsidiary
requirements because of a lacking agreement
— Post-1993 agreements: excluding agreements made between 1985 and
1993 (n: 36)
— Pre-2015 agreements: excluding agreements signed in 2015 and 2016.
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This selection is guided by computational and conceptual criteria.
Conceptually, Chapter 3 focuses on evaluating the Recast. We are therefore
interested in fundamental changes to EWC agreements and not cosmetic
changes (as with amendments), nor in EWCs established because of a lack of
agreement (as when the subsidiary requirements apply). Furthermore, the pre-
1993 agreements are not essential in this analysis as the major focus lies on
comparing the pre- and post-Recast period.
Computationally, amendments and extensions are mostly empty agreements
leading to a multitude of missing values; this influences the estimation. Pre-
1993 agreements are particularly significant outliers which influence our
estimates due to the fact that they are completely ‘voluntary’ and hardly
influenced by any (upcoming) regulation.
The 2015 agreements were deleted from the analysis because the database does
not yet have a complete set of EWC agreements made in the last year. EWC
agreements tend to be registered in the EWCdb with a certain delay. The ones
registered quickly might not be a perfectly representative sample of all EWC
agreements made. The fact that 2015 was in certain areas an outlier, led to the
decision to exclude this year from the analysis. 
Our full dataset for the following report thus represents 1078 EWC
agreements of which 107 were signed in the post-recast period. 
2. Variables
2.1 Grouping variable
Our level of analysis for Chapter 3 is the individual EWC agreement. Not all
these individual EWC agreements are independent of each other. Some
agreements are likely to resemble each other because they belong to the same
EWC. For example, a renegotiation of a certain agreement is very likely to
resemble the original agreement in various ways. For this reason, we use the
EWC as a second level grouping variable. 
2.2 Control variables
Four control variables are used in the analysis of Chapter 3:
Sector: The sector of activity of the company in which the EWC is based.
Distinction is made between six sectors:
— Chemical 
— Metal
— Services
— Food, hotel and catering
— Building and woodwork
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— Other: taking in together EWCs from companies based in the textile,
transport and public service sectors, together with EWC agreements for
which the sector of activity is unknown. 
Country cluster: This variable is based on the country in which the company
of the EWC is headquartered. As EWCs can be installed in multinational
companies based in any country of the world, we grouped the headquarter
countries into four clusters:
— Nordic countries: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. 
— Coordinated Market Economies (CME): Germany, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Austria, Luxemburg and Switzerland. 
— Mixed Market Economies (MME): France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and
Greece. 
— Liberal Market Economies (LME): the United Kingdom, Ireland, the
United States, Canada, Japan, the Central-East European countries and
others. 
Company size: This variable reflects the employment in the European
Economic Area and distinguishes between relatively small multinationals
(< 5.000 employees), medium sized multinationals (5.000-10.000 employees)
and large multinationals (>10.000 employees). 
EWC type: The EWC type refers to the overall regulatory framework which
applies to the EWC in which the EWC agreement is made. Due to some specific
articles in the original EWC and Recast Directive, distinction should be made
between three types of EWC types:
1. Pre-Directive EWCs: The first are the agreements made in EWCs
established under Article 13 of the original Directive. This article
specifies that the Directive shall not apply to EWC agreements made
before the 22nd September 1996. Moreover, if such agreements are later
renewed or renegotiated they continue to be exempted by the rules of the
Directive. An agreement made in 2015 can therefore still be exempt from
the Directive’s rules and obligations. The agreements are sometimes
called ‘voluntary agreements’, ‘Article 13 agreements’ or ‘pre-Directive
agreements’. 
2. Article 6 EWCs: A second type are the agreements from EWCs
established under Article 6 of the original EWC or Recast Directive.
These agreements are fully covered by the Directive and all its rights and
obligations which stem from it. 
3. Article 14.1b EWCs: The third type are the Article 14.1b agreements,
established under the regulation of Article 14.1b of the Recast Directive.
This article stipulates that agreements (both original and renegotiations)
made between 5 June 2009 and 5 June 2011 are given a special status.
The definitions and principles of the Recast apply to those agreements,
but not the ‘new obligations’ (Picard 2010).
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In identifying the legal basis of the signature date is an important, but not the
only variable. Even if an EWC is established in the period that would enable it
to be a pre-Directive EWC or an Article 14.1b EWC, the negotiating parties can
still decide to reject that status and consider themselves fully covered by the
directive. In that case, an EWC will be considered an Article 6 EWC. 
2.3 Time-related variables
Depending on the signature date of the EWC agreement, two time-related
variables are employed.
A first variable simply refers to the year in which the agreement was signed.
The second variable refers to the policy period in which the agreement was
signed. This variable contains four categories:
— Pre-1996, containing all agreements signed before 22 September 1996.
— 1996-2009, containing all agreements signed between 22 September
1996 and 5 June 2009.
— 2009-2011, containing all agreements signed between 5 June 1996 and
5 June 2011.
— Post-2011, containing all agreements signed after 5 June 2011.
2.4 Dependent variables
All dependent variables in this study are dummy variables (0/1), measuring
whether or not a certain clause, right or information is present in an agreement.
The data for these variables are source from a content analysis performed on
all available agreements.
— Information and consultation definitions (0/1): Dummy variable
indicating whether an agreement explicitly specifies a definition for
information and consultation.
— Select committee (0/1): Dummy variable of whether or not the
agreements specifies that a Select Committee is or will be installed for
the EWC.
— Training clause (0/1): Dummy variable of whether the agreement
specifies that EWC representatives have a right to training paid for by
the management.
— Definition of the transnational competence (0/1): Dummy variable
indicating whether an agreement explicitly specifies a definition for
transnational matters.
— Clause on reporting back (0/1): Dummy variable indicating whether or
not the agreement includes a clause on reporting back on EWC activities.
— Access to premises (0/1): Dummy variable indicating whether or not a
clause is included guaranteeing the right of employee representatives to
visit the company premises.
Too little, too late? Evaluating the European Works Councils Recast Directive
75Report 138
— Employee-only preparatory and debriefing meetings (0/1): Dummy
variable indicating whether or not the employee representatives can
have a preparatory and debriefing meeting.
— Trade union representative (0/1): Dummy variable indicating whether
or not the agreement allows representatives of a trade union to join the
EWC meetings.
— Renegotiation and termination clause (0/1): Dummy variable indicating
whether or not the agreement has a clause on the termination and rene -
go tiation of the agreement.
3. Data quality
The data used for this study is based on a content analysis of the available EWC
agreements in the ETUI’s EWC database. Although this database is by far the
most comprehensive dataset on EWC agreements and is the only one including
a thorough and consistent analysis of the agreements’ content, some data qual -
ity issues might occur. As such, there might be a coverage error if certain
agree ments are systematically not registered or a measuring error if there are
systematic coding mistakes. To assess, correct and prevent such issues, the ETUI
reviews regularly the database on errors and inconsistencies. While errors cannot
be excluded, the results of these quality checks indicate that with the inclusion
of the correct control variables, a significant bias in the estimates is unlikely. 
4. Robustness test of the GEE models
4.1 Non-linear time effects
In Chapter 3 of this report several models are presented, including time as a
linear effect. When working with GEE estimations, linear effects mean a
constant change in the odds over time, which is actually a non-linear growth
effect. However, one could also model the continuous time variable as a
quadratic variable, which would model whether the change in the odds is
changing over time or not. Training, for example, could experience a slow start,
but once this ‘best practice’ is taken up, the growth rate increases. Analysis of
the different models including such a quadratic learning effect nevertheless
revealed no such significant effect. 
4.2 Interactions
Chapter 3 of this report concentrated on the learning effect and a discrete
policy effect which immediately influences the likelihood of a clause to be
included in an agreement. One could, however, also conceive a different policy
effect; one that increases the learning curve and thus the general learning
effect. Alternative models including such an interaction term were fitted. These
models did not provide indications for an effect in which the Recast affected
the general learning curve. 
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Annex 2
EWC agreement content: evolutions and
bivariate relations 
This annex gives a descriptive overview of the evolution over time of the several
dependent variables included in Chapter 3. 
1. EWC agreement demographics
1.1 Agreements over time
The amount of EWC agreements signed each year follows a very particular
pattern (Figure A.1). Initiated in the 80s, the EWC agreements got off to a
rather slow start with less than 10 agreements signed each year. This
nevertheless radically changes in 1994 with the publication of the first EWC
Directive. This Directive included a clause specifying that EWCs created before
22 September 1996 were exempted from the rules of the Directive if they met
certain criteria. As a result, a record amount of 427 EWC agreements were
signed, of which 403 established a new EWC. 
Following the implementation of this Directive, the amount of agreements
signed each year declined to less than 100. After a slight increase in the amount
of agreements around 1998-2000, the overall pattern has since been one of
constant decline in the amount of EWC agreements signed. 
There are, however, different types of EWC agreements. As such, distinction
is made between: 
— Original installation agreements: first EWC agreements which establish
a new EWC
— Renegotiations: fundamental changes to the functioning of the EWC 
— Amendment/ extension: agreements on small changes to the existing
agreement or simple extension of the current agreement for a new
period.
As can be expected, in the first few years the EWC agreements are almost
exclusively original agreements establishing an EWC. Over the years, the share
of renegotiations, amendments and extensions increases. From 2002 onwards,
the changes to existing agreements (amendment, extension and renegotiation)
represent about half of all EWC agreements made in a given year.
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1.2 EWC agreements across sectors
Next to an unequal distribution over time, the EWC agreements are also
unequally distributed over sectors. Figure A.2 shows the amount of EWC
agreements per sector. Evidently, the bulk of the EWC agreements are made
in the metal, chemical and services sectors. 
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Figure A.1 EWC agreements over time 
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Figure A.2 EWC agreements across sectors 
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Focusing only on the ‘full agreements’ (original agreements and full renego -
tiations), an uneven distribution over time is also observed. Table A.1 shows
the proportion of agreements per sector for subsequent five-year periods.
These results show that the metal and chemical sectors continue to account for
the largest share of EWC agreements, but that the other sectors are growing
relatively more important over time.
1.3 EWC agreements across company size
Figure A.3 shows the distribution of agreements across different company
sizes. Most EWC agreements are signed in (relatively) small multinationals
(< 5.000 employees in the EEA) and large multinationals (> 10.000 employees
in the EEA). Moreover, in large companies, a relatively higher number of the
EWC agreements are full renegotiations. 
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Figure A.3 EWC agreements across company size 
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Table A.1 Sectoral distribution over time
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2009
2010-2014
Chemicals
23%
18%
15%
16%
Metal
32%
37%
33%
27%
Services
13%
20%
28%
22%
Horeca
13%
8%
4%
12%
Building
8%
9%
6%
10%
Other/Unknown
11%
8%
14%
13%
Focusing only on the ‘full agreements’ (original agreements and full
renegotiations), Table A.2 shows a shifting pattern in terms of the size of the
companies in which agreements are made. Obviously, the share of agreements
made in companies of which the size is unknown increases. This is related to
the decision to stop updating the database with multinationals covered by the
Directive and focus exclusively on companies with EWCs.
1.4 EWC agreements across country cluster
The amount of EWC agreements also differs depending on the headquarter
country of the company. As can be seen in Figure A.4, most EWC agreements
are signed in companies from CMEs.
Considering only the full agreements (original, renegotiation and post-merger),
Table A.3 demonstrates a change in the pattern. The relative weight of CME
countries in the total amount of EWC agreements made is diminishing in
favour of agreements made in MME headquartered companies. 
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Table A.2 Company size distribution over time
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2009
2010-2014
Unknown
4%
5%
22%
27%
Small
37%
35%
29%
30%
Medium
16%
21%
19%
11%
Large
43%
38%
30%
32%
Figure A.4 EWC agreements across countries 
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1.5 EWC agreements across type
Finally, the distribution of EWC agreements over the type of EWC is examined.
As discussed above, EWC can fall under different regulatory frameworks
depending on the year of establishment and the will of the negotiating partners
(Figure A.5). As many EWCs still function as ‘pre-Directive EWCs’ (De
Spiegelaere and Jagodzinski 2015), a lot of EWC agreements are negotiated in
such bodies. These EWCs are older, which explains the higher share of
renegotiations and extensions. Next, we see that only 56 agreements are made
in Article 14 EWCs. Of those 56, only 35 can be considered as full agreements
(original installation agreements or full renegotiations).
Table A.4 demonstrates the evolution of the shares over subsequent five-year
periods. Obviously, in the first period (‘95-‘99) the majority of agreements are
made in pre-Directive EWCs. However, this quickly changes; in all subsequent
periods most agreements are made in Article 6 EWCs. 
Too little, too late? Evaluating the European Works Councils Recast Directive
81Report 138
Figure A.5 EWC agreements across EWC type 
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Table A.3 EWC agreements across country clusters, per ﬁve-year period
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2009
2010-2014
Nordic
16%
14%
13%
16%
CME
39%
31%
29%
26%
MME
11%
25%
24%
37%
LME
35%
30%
35%
21%
1.6 Conclusion
Looking at the EWC agreement demographics, some remarkable and uneven
patterns are apparent. The EWC agreements are not evenly distributed over
time, with 1996 being a huge outlier with more than 400 agreements signed.
Over the years, the proportion of renegotiations tends to increase over time.
Also, with regard to sector, company size and headquarter country of the firm,
the distribution of EWC agreements is uneven. Proportionally more EWC
agreements are signed in the metal and chemical sector, in large companies
and in companies from CMEs. 
Moreover, if we focus on the proportional distribution of these agreement
characteristics in each year, we see both considerable year-to-year fluctuations
and some more consistent evolutions, such as:
— An overall decline in the share of EWC agreements signed in the
chemical sector over time and a parallel increase of the share of
agreements signed in the service sector. 
— An overall decline in the share of EWC agreements signed in large firms.
— An overall decline in the share of EWC agreements signed in companies
headquartered in CMEs and an overall increase in MMEs. 
— The share of agreements signed in pre-Directive EWCs falls sharply after
1996 and declines further over time.
2. Agreement content and characteristics: bivariate
relations
Table A.5 contains shares of agreements containing a certain clause or defini -
tions for each sector, country-cluster, company size, EWC type and period. 
Sector: The agreement company differs significantly according to the sector of
occupation on three variables. For clauses on reporting back we see that they
are more common than average in the metal sector and less common in
agreements from the building and woodwork sectors. The opposite pattern is
observable for clauses on trade union representatives, which are also more
present in agreements from the food, hotel and catering sector. Clauses on
access to premises, on the other hand, are less present in the food, hotel and
catering sector.
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Table A.4 EWC agreements across EWC type, per ﬁve-year period
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2009
2010-2014
Pre-Directive
68%
17%
10%
11%
Art. 6
20%
75%
81%
66%
Art. 14
0%
0%
5%
13%
Other
12%
7%
4%
11%
Country: The headquarter country of the company is important for all but two
variables: the presence of a select committee and preparatory and debriefing
meetings. For all others there are significant country cluster differences.
Interestingly, agreements from LMEs are more likely than average to have
clauses on definition of the transnational competence and reporting back. 
Company size: The company size plays a less important role and the patterns
are not always clear. Clauses on trade union representatives, however, are more
present in agreements from large companies than in others. 
EWC type: The EWC type plays an important role for almost all variables
except for clauses on reporting back and the presence of a trade union
representative. In general, agreements made in Article 6 EWCs are more likely
to have any of the included variables.
Period: As expected, the policy period plays a significant role for all variables
and mostly because more recent agreements are more likely to have definitions
and specific clauses then older agreements. One interesting exception is the
presence of trade union representatives, which seems higher in pre-1996
agreements than in more recent ones.
3. Trends over time
The share of yearly agreements including information and consultation
definitions has increased over time and has been about 80% in the last few
years. The share of agreements including a select committee was already quite
high in the ‘90s yet continued to increase and now virtually all EWC
agreements made in the last 10 years include a select committee. Training
clauses were not so common in the period before 1996, yet this practice
proliferated quite quickly until stabilizing at around 70% of the yearly
agreements between 1997 and 2004. The share further increased over time and
now close to 90% of all agreements signed in the last five years includes such
a clause. 
With regards to aspects of articulation, a definition of the transnational
competence was already present in about half or more of the agreements until
around 2005. Over the past ten years the share further increased, reaching
about 80% in the last couple of years. The same can be said about clauses on
reporting back. They were already quite common in early agreements yet
stabilized for a long time at around 60% of agreements. In recent years, the
share increased to more than 80%. The last aspect of articulation, access to
premises, is a lot less common. In the early years, virtually none of the
agreements included such a right. Apart from year-to-year fluctuations, the
share of agreements increased over time to about 25% in the last years.
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With regard to preparatory and debriefing meetings, we equally see a very low
share providing for those in the early years and, again, the share rose to about
70% in the last years.
The inclusion of a trade union representative clearly follows different trends.
First of all, the overall share of agreements providing for such representatives
is quite low. Additionally, the tendency over time is not clear. The overall share
of agreements does not seem to follow a growing trend.
With regard to the inclusion of both a renegotiation and termination clause,
the observed pattern shows a rather quick initial learning phase, with an
increase in the proportion of agreements including both clauses from 30% to
over 50%. Afterwards, the proportion seemed to stabilize at around 70%.
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